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ABSTRACT
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Quality Assurance Problem in a Two-Echelon
Supply Chain with a Retailer as the Quality Gatekeeper
by
LI Zaichen
Master of Philosophy
We consider a two-level supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer who
serves as the quality gatekeeper. The manufacturer determines a wholesale price
and a defective rate and announces his decisions to the retailer, who then makes
her decisions on the retail price and identication rate that means the percent-
age of the defects identied by the retailer and reects the retailers gatekeeping
e¤ort on her quality assurance. We accordingly develop a leader-follower game
and solve it to nd Stackelberg equilibrium for the manufacturer and the retailer.
In order to examine whether or not the supply chain benets from the retailers
quality gatekeeping e¤ort, we also develop and solve another leader-follower game
where the manufacturer still announces its wholesale pricing and defective rate
decisions but the retailer only decides on the retail price. We show that the
manufacturers equilibrium defective rate for the game with the retailers gate-
keeping is higher than that for the game without the retailers gatekeeping. The
ratio of the manufacturers prot to the retailers prot is increased when the
retailer serves as the gatekeeper. Moreover, the retailer reduces her price when
she acts as the gatekeeper, if and only if the supply chain-wide cost decreases as
a result of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. We also perform sensitivity analysis
of each parameter in our game models to further examine the impacts of the re-
tailers gatekeeping on the manufacturers and the retailers decisions and prots.
We nd that the retailers penalty cost per defect has more signicant impacts
than the manufacturers unit penalty cost. The paper ends with a summary of
managerial insights.
Key words: Quality; supply chain; gatekeeper; defective rate; identication rate;
price; Stackelberg equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Quality has been playing an increasingly important role in highly competitive
industries, and it has been widely treated as one of the most important deter-
minants of a rms success in domestic and international markets. In the past
two decades, many rms in both the manufacturing and the service elds have
paid intensive attention to the improvement in the quality of their products and
services. Without a continuous focus on the quality improvement, a rm may
have to experience a great loss in its protability due to product or service qual-
ity problems. For example, as Tabuchi [26] reported, in 2010, Toyota received
complaints from customers about its defects resulting in tra¢ c accidents, and
the rm was thus the only major automaker to experience a sales decline in the
United States. In January 2011, Toyota decided to globally recall 1.7 million vehi-
cles that have defective fuel lines and high-pressure fuel pumps, drawing renewed
attention to the quality of the companys products.
There are a number of di¤erent but similar denitions on the product or
service quality. In [25], Stevenson simply dened the quality as the ability of a
product or service to consistently meet or exceed customer expectations. That
is, for the sake of quality assurance, each rm should reduce the number (or,
the percentage) of defects (for the manufacturing systems) or complaints (for the
service systems), thus satisfying the customer needs. For a manufacturing system,
we learn from BusinessDictionary.com a more specic denition on the quality
of a tangible product, which indicates that the product quality is a measure
of excellence or a state of being free from defects, deciencies, and signicant
variations. In this paper, we focus on the control of a tangible products quality
in a two-echelon supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer.
In practice, many manufacturers spend great e¤orts on the quality assurance
to prevent defects by, e.g., adopting the deployment of a quality management sys-
tem and preventative activities such as failure mode and e¤ects analysis (FMEA).
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Accordingly, a number of scholars have investigated the manufacturers diverse
quality assurance problems from the academic perspective, as shown by our lit-
erature review in Section 2. However, very few existing papers consider the
involvement of a retailer into the quality assurance. In fact, a retailer may serve
as the quality gatekeeper to assure the quality by identifying the defects among
the products bought from the manufacturer. For example, Wal-Mart allocates
considerable human resources for the quality assurance, acting as the quality
gatekeeper. Je¤ Macho, the senior vice president and managing director of Wal-
Mart Global Procurement, states that quality is a top priority for Wal-Mart and
it is an area where Wal-Mart continuously challenge itself for improvement. On
July 11, 2008, the Global Procurement Organization of Wal-Mart announced an
enhancement to its quality assurance processes by selecting the Intertek Group
which is a leading European provider of quality and safety solutions serving a
wide range of industries around the world; see www.intertek.com to provide
nal inspection services for merchandise sourced in China. The Intertek Group
is responsible for not only testing, inspecting, and certifying products but also
helping customers improve performance, gain e¢ ciencies in manufacturing and
logistics, overcome market constraints, and reduce risk. As Je¤ Macho further
explained, the Intertek Group will provide Wal-Mart with an independent assess-
ment of product quality, which helps assure that merchandise can meet or exceed
Wal-Marts specications. For more information, see, e.g., a report released by
Wal-Mart in [27].
In this paper, we are motived by Wal-Marts quality gatekeeping e¤ort to in-
vestigate the impacts of a retailers gatekeeping in a two-echelon supply chain. In
the supply chain, the manufacturer determines his wholesale price and defective
rate that is the percentage of defects in his products and reects the manufac-
turers e¤ort on the quality assurance. Note that the quality has been widely
dened by academics as the defective rate; for a comprehensive discussion, see,
e.g., Reeves and Bednar [21]. Moreover, in practice, it is not necessary for most
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manufacturers to promise zero defective rate; see, e.g., Schneiderman [23]. Re-
sponding to the manufacturers decisions, the retailer decides on her retail price
and identication rate, which is the percentage of the defects identied by the
retailer in all defects bought from the manufacturer. The retailers identication
rate reects her quality gatekeeping e¤ort. The defects identied by the retailer
will be returned by the retailer to the manufacturer without selling to customers.
After receiving a returned defect, the manufacturer should pay a penalty to the
retailer, replace the defect with a good-quality product for the retailer, and dis-
pose the defect at a cost for repair, salvage, etc. If the retailer does not identify a
defect and sells the defect to a customer, then the customer will eventually return
the defect to the retailer who incurs a penalty cost. The retailer then returns the
defect to the manufacturer and obtains a penalty from the manufacture, who
provides the retailer with a good-quality product and disposes the defect at a
cost. We plot Figure 1 to describe the process of quality assurance.
Figure 1: The process of quality assurance in the supply chain with the retailer
as the quality gatekeeper.
In the supply chain, we consider each rms joint pricing and quality assurance
decisions, because of the following reason: if the rm spends more e¤orts on
quality assurance, then he or she incurs a higher cost and thus has an incentive to
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increase the rms price. But, the quality assurance results in an improvement of
the product quality, thereby decreasing the number of defects sold to consumers
and reducing the rms penalty cost for sold defects. This may help the rm
achieve a cost reduction, which induces the rm to decrease the price. From the
above, we nd that the wholesale and the retail prices may or may not increase as
a result of the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. Thus, an important research
problem to be addressed in this paper is regarding the impacts of the retailers
gatekeeping on the manufacturers and the retailers pricing decisions.
We characterize the supply chain operations as a leader-follower (sequential)
game, where the manufacturer rst determines his wholesale price and defective
rate as the leader and the retailer then responds by making her pricing and
identication rate decisions as the follower. Solving the game, we obtain the
two supply chain membersdecisions in Stackelberg equilibrium. We analytically
show that the retailers identication rate is determined such that the retailers
marginal quality-assurance cost is equal to her expected penalty cost for each
defect sold to consumers. We also nd that the manufacturers defective rate
is independent of his per defect penalty cost but dependent on the retailers per
defect penalty cost and his own cost of disposing each returned defect. This
means that the value of the manufacturers penalty cost for each defect does not
a¤ect his decision on the defective rate, when the retailer takes the gatekeeping
role.
Next, we compare the manufacturers and the retailers decisions and prots
with those when the retailer does not participate in the quality assurance, in
order to investigate the impacts of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. That is, since
the manufacturer always needs to assure the quality no matter whether or not
the retailer serves as the gatekeeper, it is naturally necessary to investigate how
the manufacturers defective rate varies when the retailer is involved into the
quality assurance. We also examine whether or not the manufacturer and the
retailer benet from the retailers gatekeeping by achieving higher prots. Thus,
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we formulate and analyze another leader-follower game, where the manufacturer
and the retailer still serve the leader and the follower, respectively, but the retailer
does not act as the gatekeeper and does not determine the identication rate.
For the process of the quality assurance in the game without the retailers quality
assurance, see Figure 2. We solve the game and nd corresponding Stackelberg
equilibrium, which is then compared with that when the retailer serves as a
gatekeeper. We learn from our analysis that, if the manufacturers marginal
quality assurance cost is higher than the retailers, then he should promise a
smaller defective rate to the retailer. Moreover, in the game with the retailer as
the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturer can achieve his prot twice as much as
the retailers prot.
Figure 2: The process of quality assurance in the supply chain without the re-
tailers gatekeeping e¤ort.
We analytically show that the manufacturers equilibrium defective rate for
the game with the retailers quality gatekeeping is always higher than that for the
game without the retailers gatekeeping. That is, the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort
induces the manufacturer to reduce his e¤ort on the quality assurance. Further-
more, if the retailers cost reduction made by her gatekeeping e¤ort is larger than
manufacturers cost reduction, then the wholesale price for the game with the
retailers gatekeeping is higher than that for the game without the retailers gate-
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keeping. We also nd that, if the supply chain-wide cost is reduced as a result of
the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, then the retailers retail price when the retailer
serves as the gatekeeper is smaller than that when the retailer does not serve
as the gatekeeper. Since, without the retailers gatekeeping, the manufacturers
prot is less than twice as much as the retailers prot, we nd that the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort increase the ratio of the manufacturerprot to the retailers
prot.
We then analytically and numerically perform sensitivity analysis of each pa-
rameter in our game model, to investigate the impacts of the parameter on the
manufacturers and the retailers decisions and prots. From our analysis, we
draw a large number of managerial insights. For example, we analytically show
that the retailers per defect penalty cost more signicantly a¤ects the two supply
chain membersequilibrium decisions and prots, compared with the manufac-
turers per defect penalty cost. We also nd that the manufacturers wholesale
price is increasing in his per defect penalty cost, no matter whether or not the
retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper. As the retailers per defect penalty cost
increases, the manufacturer reduces his wholesale price when the retailer serves
as the quality gatekeeper; but, he increases his wholesale price when the retailer
does not serve as the gatekeeper. When the retailer is involved into the quality
assurance, the retailers identication rate is increasing in her per defect penalty
cost whereas the manufacturers defective rate is decreasing in the cost. When
the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers defective
rate is also decreasing in the retailers penalty cost. Our results demonstrate that
both the manufacturers and the retailers prots are decreasing in the retailers
penalty cost per defect.
When the manufacturers unit acquisition cost is increased, we analytically
show that, for the game with and the game without the retailers quality gate-
keeping e¤ort, the manufacturer and the retailer increase their wholesale and
retail prices, respectively, and the two supply chain membersprots decrease.
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In addition, the reduction in the manufacturers prot is greater than the re-
duction in the retailers prot. Our analytic results also indicate that, as the
manufacturer disposes each unit of defect at a higher cost, he should decrease his
defective rate and the retailer should also reduce her identication rate. In ad-
dition, without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, both the wholesale price
and the retail price are increasing in the manufacturers disposing cost but their
prots are both decreasing in such a cost. But, for the game with the retailers
gatekeeping, the wholesale price is decreasing in the disposing cost whereas the
retail price is increasing in s, and both the manufacturers and the retailers prof-
its are reduced as a result of increasing the manufacturers disposing cost. In
addition to the sensitivity analysis of the above important parameters, we also
examine the impacts of the parameters in the demand function, the parameters
in the manufacturers and the retailers quality-assurance cost functions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we review
quality assurance-related publications to show the originality of our paper. In
Section 3, we formulate and analyze the leader-follower game with the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort. Section 4 presents our analysis regarding the impacts of the
retailers gatekeeping e¤ort on the supply chain. In the section, we rst analyze
the leader-follower game when the retailer does not serve as the quality gate-
keeper, and then compare the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium with that
for the game with the retailers gatekeeping. We also perform sensitivity analysis
of major parameters in our game model to discuss the impacts of the parameters
on the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions and prots. The
paper ends with a summary of major managerial insights in Section 5. Moreover,
we list all notations in Table 2, which is given in Appendix A.
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2 Literature Review
In this section, we review major publications regarding the quality assurance in
manufacturing systems. In the past three decades, a number of scholars have
published some review papers that are concerned with the quality management.
However, we nd that most of the existing review papers were proposed to discuss
the quality-related issues in some specic industries such as food, healthcare, etc.
Though, there are still three major review paper concerning the quality assurance
that does not apply to a specic industry. As an early publication associated with
quality management, Rao and Monroe [20] provided an integrative review on pre-
vious research that had investigated experimentally the inuence of price, brand
name, and/or store name on buyersevaluations of product quality. In addition,
the authors used meta-analytic procedures to nd that, for consumer products,
the relationships between price and perceived quality and between brand name
and perceived quality are positive and statistically signicant. In [19], Powell
reviewed existing empirical evidence to examine that total quality management
(TQM) is a potential source of sustainable competitive advantage, and summa-
rized major ndings from a new empirical study of TQMs performance conse-
quences. Chan andWu [5] proposed a literature review of quality function deploy-
ment (QFD) using a reference bank of about 650 QFD publications established
through searching various sources. The authors rst mentioned the origination
and historical development of QFD with a partial list of QFD organizations, soft-
ware, and online resources. Then, they conducted a categorical analysis about
QFDs functional elds, applied industries, and methodological development, and
also suggested ten informative QFD publications.
From the above, we nd that Rao and Monroe [20] considered the empirical
study from the marketing perspective; Powell [19] also used the empirical evidence
to discuss the important role of TQM in industry; and, Chan and Wu [5] focused
on the review of the QFD that is a specic technique in the quality management.
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This means that our review in this section di¤ers from the existing quality-related
review papers. Next, we briey summarize major publications that are relevant to
the assurance of product quality, with an emphasis on the analytic investigations.
2.1 Quality Assurance in a Single Operating System
We learn from our review that, prior to two decades, some analytic models were
developed to analyze the quality problem for a single rm. For example, from
the marketing perspective, Shapiro [24] treated reputation as an expectation of
quality in the market where consumers are incompletely informed about the prod-
uct quality before their purchases. The author found that the uncertainty about
quality is a widespread and important feature of markets for most rmss good
and services. Schneiderman [23] developed a simple model to investigate the op-
timal quality level in terms of the defective rate, assuming that, as the defective
rate rises, the failure costs decline while appraisal plus prevention costs increase.
The author concluded that each rm does not need to assure zero defects from
the economic perspective, because a further improvement of quality above the
optimum quality level increases total cost and decrease nancial performance.
Fine [11] reviewed some papers that had challenged the traditional literatures
indicating that improving the quality of a product increases the unit production
cost. The author showed that high quality and low costs may be consistent under
the help of learning curve, and thus suggested that rms should be investing more
in improving their productsquality if they have been neglecting the e¤ectiveness
of quality-based learning.
Next, we review the publications concerning the quality control in manufac-
turing processes. In [15], Lee and Rose dealt with the problem of simultaneous
determination of the economic manufacturing quantity and the schedule of in-
spection for process maintenance, assuming that product quality is a function
of the state of the production process. The authors considered the length of
production run as a decision variable, and addressed the problem of joint opti-
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mization of production lot size and maintenance by inspections. Ng and Hui [18]
considered the monitoring of an ongoing production process subject to complete
inspection, which includes an in-control state and an out-of-control state. The
production process was assumed to make products with a quality characteristic
following a known probability distribution. If a products quality characteristic
exceeds an action limit, then the decision maker takes remedial action to restore
the process to the in-control state; and, the decision maker has a learning oppor-
tunity to improve the process by investing in resources to identify and eliminate
the causes of deviation from the target quality. The authors developed a cost
model describing the trade-o¤ between quality cost and process improvement
cost to determine the optimal number of learning actions to be taken and the
optimal action limit.
The following three publications focus on the methodologies for the quality
control in a manufacturing system. Choo, Linderman, and Schroeder [7] in-
vestigates the method- and the psychologically-driven mechanisms of knowledge
creation in Six Sigma projects. The authors showed that the method-driven
mechanism directly inuences learning behaviors, while the psychological-driven
mechanism directly a¤ects knowledge creation. Moreover, the authors found that,
when a rm adopts a quality program such as Six Sigma, the method and the
degree of its adherence inuence the rms innovations and knowledge creations.
Chun [9] developed a maximum likelihood method and also a Bayesian method
to estimate both the number of undiscovered errors in the product and the detec-
tion probability, and then compared their performances with that of the existing
nonlinear regression method. The author found that it would be worthwhile to
use various estimation methods and compare their estimates in a specic inspec-
tion environment. Chan and Spedding [4] used an on-line, non-disruptive neural
network metamodel to obtain quality information from a manufacturing system
which can thus be congured to provide optimal performance in terms of quality
and productivity at the lowest cost. The authors also used a case to illustrate
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this approach.
2.2 Joint Pricing and Quality Assurance Decisions
We now provide a review of the publications regarding the joint pricing and qual-
ity decisions, which are involved into our model in this paper. As a seminal paper
about the price and quality, Leavitt [14] experimentally examined buyerstenden-
cies to use price as an indicator of quality. Following Leavitt [14], a large number
of empirical and experimental papers investigated the price-quality relationship
from the marketing perspective; for a detailed review, see, e.g., Rao and Monroe
[20].
White [29] published an early paper to analytically address the price-quality
problem. The author supposed that an industry composed of n rms produces a
basic output transportation,and a second output meals,which is a quality
aspect of the primary output. That is, in [29], White considered two quantity
decision variables including the second variable (i.e., amount of meals) as the
quality measurement. Gal-Or [12] mainly aimed to consider the implications
of entry upon quality levels and prices, assuming that the quality level is an
observable variable. The author originally constructed a game model involving
n > 1 rms who make products of di¤erent quality levels with the unit production
cost as an increasing function of the quality level. Multiple symmetric equilibria
were obtained if the distribution of consumers according to their willingness to
pay is not uniform and more than one rm participates in the market. With a
uniform distribution, the author showed that the impact of entry is to reduce
average quality and to increase aggregate output.
In the note [28], Wauthy proposed a two-stage game where two rms simul-
taneouslydetermine the quality level for their products in the rst stage and
then determine their prices to compete for consumers in the second stage. Wau-
thy showed that the quality di¤erential is negatively related to the population
dispersion, and found that the degree of heterogeneity in the population places
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an upper bound to the extent of product di¤erentiation, which amends earlier
results on the subject.
2.3 Quality Assurance in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain
We note that, for the quality problem in supply chain operations, a few publi-
cations appeared before one decade and most papers were published only during
the past ve years. This happens probably because the academic scholars in
the management science/operations management eld started to focus on supply
chain-related research in the middle of 1990s. As an early paper on this subject,
Chu and Chu [8] provided an example of renting the reputation of another agent
to investigate a quality problem in which a manufacturer can signal quality by
selling through a reputable retailers. As consumerswillingness to buy high qual-
ity products is increased, the manufacturer intends to make a high-quality good
and signal its quality to consumers via a retailer. Using the signaling game, the
author showed that, in a maximallyseparating equilibrium, the manufacturer
of high-quality products distributes through retailers with a strong reputation,
while the manufacturer of low-quality products distributes through retailers with
no reputation.
Zhu, Zhang, and Tsung [31] considered a supply chain in which a buyer designs
a product and owns the brand but outsources the production to a supplier. Both
the buyer and the supplier incur quality-related costs, thus having an incentive
to invest in quality-improvement e¤orts. The authors showed that the buyers in-
volvement for quality improvement has a signicant impact on both the suppliers
and the buyers prots, and they also investigated how quality-improvement de-
cisions interact with the buyers order quantity and the suppliers production lot
size. Saouma [22] analyzed a supply chain in which a manufacturer outsources
an assembly (second-stage) task to a preestablished supplier. As the supplier
invests in the quality liability under the constraint of warranty contracts, the
manufacturer is shown to prefer more testing when she outsources assembly to
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her supplier as opposed to when she assembles products in house. The authors
also found that the contracting frictions identied persist when the suppliers
work is tested individually.
Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan [6] investigated a two-level supply chain involv-
ing a manufacturer and a supplier who may reach two contractual agreements
by which they can share product recall costs to induce their quality improve-
ment e¤orts. The two agreements includes (i) cost sharing based on selective
root cause analysis and (ii) partial cost sharing based on complete root cause
analysis. For each agreement, the authors used insights from supermodular game
theory to characterize the levels of e¤ort that the manufacturer and the supplier
would exert in equilibrium to improve their component failure rate when their
e¤ort choices are subject to moral hazard. The authors also showed that the
menu of contracts not only signicantly decreases the manufacturers cost due
to information asymmetry, but also improves product quality. Hsieh and Liu
[13] considered the quality improvement and inspection policy between a sup-
plier and a manufacturer in a two-echelon supply chain, involving the suppliers
and the manufacturers quality investment and inspection strategies in four non-
cooperative games with di¤erent degrees of information available. The authors
investigated the e¤ects of inspection-related information on both partiesequilib-
rium strategies and prots, and further discussed the rationality of the penalty
on defective components.
From our above review, a large number of publications are concerned with the
quality problem in a variety of operating systems. However, we note that very
few papers considered a supply chain in which the manufacturer determines a
wholesale price and a defective rate and the retailer serves as a quality gatekeeper
to make a quality-related decision in addition to the retail pricing decision. The
problem is actually important because, as discussed in Section 1, some practical
retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart) have been assuring the quality as the gatekeepers. We
thus accordingly investigate the problem in this paper.
13
3 The Game-Theoretic Model and Analysis when
the Retailer Assures the Quality as a Gate-
keeper
In this section, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain involving a manufac-
turer and a retailer. The manufacturer sells his products to the retailer at a
wholesale price, who then serves consumers in a single market. To promise the
product quality, the manufacturer announces a pre-determined defective rate to
the retailer. In order to examine the manufacturers quality commitment, the
retailer adopts the gatekeeping approach to inspect the quality of incoming
products. Similar to Balachandran and Radhakrishnan [1], we assume that the
retailer may not nd all defects in her sampling inspection process but instead
identify a percentage of the defects, which depends on the retailers inspection
e¤ort in terms of, e.g., sampling size. Hereafter, for simplicity, we name the per-
centage as identication rate,which can be regarded as the retailers decision
variable, because of the following fact: Since the rate is dependent on the retailers
inspection e¤ort, the retailer can determine her e¤ort on the quality control and
assure the identication rate.
In practice, the manufacturer should rst make his decisions on the wholesale
price and the committed defective rate and announce them to the retailer. Then,
the retailer determines her retail price and identication rate. Accordingly, we
can model the decision problem as a leader-follower (sequential) game, where the
manufacturer and the retailer act as a leaderand a follower,respectively. As
a result, these two supply chain membersoptimal decisions can be characterized
by using the Stackelberg equilibrium. To develop and solve the leader-follower
game, we should use the backward approach to (i) analyze the retailers best-
response decisions given the manufactures wholesale price and defective rate; (ii)
investigate the manufacturers optimal decisions using the retailers best-response
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decisions; and then (iii) calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Next, we start with the best-response analysis for the retailer.
3.1 The Retailers Best-Response Analysis
We now assume that the manufacturers wholesale price w and defective rate
r are given, and maximize the retailers prot to nd her optimal retail price
and identication rate. We begin by building the prot function for the retailer,
who sells the manufacturers products to meet consumersdeterministic demands.
To simplify our analysis and nd meaningful insights, we describe the aggregate
price-dependent demand D(p) in a linear form, i.e., D(p) = a   bp, where p
denotes the retail price which is the retailers decision variable, and a > 0 and
b > 0 represent the constant (price-independent) demand component and the
sensitivity of demand to the retail price p, respectively. Such a linear price-
dependent demand model has been widely used in the economics, marketing, and
operations management elds; see Bertrand [2], Corbett and Karmarkar [10], Lim
and Ho [17], etc.
Because the manufacturers defective rate is r 2 [0; 1], the number of defects
delivered by the manufacturer to the retailer is calculated as r  D(p). The
retailer inspects the products, and identies each defect only with the probability
 2 [0; 1], which represents the retailers inspection e¤ort. This means that the
number of defects identied by the retailer is   r  D(p), and the number of
defects that the retailer cannot nd is (1  ) rD(p). For the identied and
the unidentied defects, we have the following discussion:
1. When the retailer nds rD(p) units of the defects, she should immedi-
ately return the defects to the manufacturer, who then replaces the defects
with   r  D(p) new, good-quality products. Meanwhile, the manufac-
turer should absorb the penalty cost  rD(p), where  denotes the
penalty cost that the manufacturer pays to the retailer for each unit of the
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defect.
2. When the retailer cannot immediately nd (1  ) r D(p) units of the
defects, the consumers will buy these defects and will eventually return
them to the retailer, who thus incurs the penalty cost ^ (1 )rD(p)
with ^ representing the retailers unit penalty cost. We note that, di¤erent
from the manufacturers unit penalty cost , the retailers unit penalty cost
^ could be estimated as the handling and goodwill costs incurred by the
retailer. But, the retailer needs to return (1   )  r  D(p) defects to
the manufacturer, and charge the manufacturer the penalty cost   (1  
) r D(p). To assure the retailers incentive on the quality control, we
reasonably assume that ^  .
From the above, we learn that rD(p) units of defects will be replaced with
good-quality products. To satisfy all consumersdemands, the retailer should
order D(p) units of the products from the manufacturer. It thus follows that the
retailers prot generated from the sale is calculated as (p w)D(p). In addition,
the retailer absorbs the penalty cost ^ (1  ) r D(p) for the unidentied
defects. But, the retailer can receive the manufacturers penalty   r  D(p)
while returning the identied and unidentied defects to the manufacturer. Since
the retailer spends e¤ort on the quality control to assure the identication rate
, she should incurs the  dependent inspection cost C^()D(p), where C^()
denote the unit inspection cost. Naturally, the retailers e¤ort and unit inspection
cost C^() should be increasing in , i.e., C^ 0() > 0. Moreover, when  is small
(e.g.,  = 0:1), the retailer may not need to exert much e¤ort to increase the
identication rate, whereas, when  is large (e.g.,  = 0:8), the retailer may have
to exert considerable e¤ort for the improvement of the identication rate. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that C^ 00() > 0.
Using the above, we can calculate the retailers prot R as her prot (p  
w)D(p) minus her inspection cost C^()D(p) and her penalty cost ^ (1 )
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r D(p) plus the manufacturers penalty  r D(p). That is,
R = (p  w)D(p)  C^()D(p)  ^ (1  ) r D(p) +  r D(p),
which, using D(p) = a  bp, can be re-written as,
R = (a  bp)[(p  w)  C^() + ^   r + (  ^) r]. (1)
Theorem 1 Given the manufacturers wholesale price w and promised defective
rate r, we maximize her prot R in (1) and nd that the retailers optimal
identication rate  uniquely satises the equation that C^ 0() = ^r. The
retailers optimal retail price p can be uniquely obtained as
p =
1
2
na
b
+ w + C^()  r[  ^(1  )]
o
. (2)
Proof. The proof of this theorem and our proofs of all subsequent theorems are
provided in Appendix B.
From the above theorem, we nd that the retailers optimal identication rate
 which reects the retailers e¤ort on the quality assurance is dependent on
the retailers quality control cost function C^(), the retailers penalty cost ^ for a
unit of defect sold to consumers, and the manufacturers promised defective rate
r. This means that the manufacturers wholesale price and the retailers sale price
do not a¤ect the retailers quality control decision. Moreover, we note that ^r
means the retailers expected penalty cost for each unit of the product bought from
the manufacturer. As Theorem 1 indicates, the retailers optimal identication
rate  should be determined such that the retailers marginal quality control
cost is equal to her unit expected penalty cost. This result is justied as follows:
If the retailer increases the identication rate (in examining each product) by one
percent, then the retailers quality assurance cost is increased by C^ 0(). For each
unit of the product, the retailer incurs the expected penalty cost ^r for the quality
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problem. If C^ 0() < ^r, then the retailer should spend more e¤ort to increase
the identication rate; otherwise, if C^ 0() > ^r, then the retailer should decrease
the rate because the quality assurance cost is higher than the expected penalty
cost. Therefore, the optimal identication rate  should satisfy the equation
that C^ 0() = ^r, which implies that the manufacturer can a¤ect the retailers
optimal decision on her identication rate. More specically, we di¤erentiate the
two sides of C^ 0() = ^r w.r.t. r, and nd that C^ 00()(@=@r) = ^. As a result,
@=@r > 0; that is, if the manufacturer spends less e¤ort on the quality control
and his defective rate thus rises, then the retailer should respond by paying more
attention to the quality gatekeeping and increasing her identication rate.
To discuss the retailers optimal price p, we re-write the equation (2) that p
satises (as given in Theorem 1) as,
p = a=b  p + w + C^()  r[  ^(1  )]
= fw + C^()  r[  ^(1  )]g+D(p)=b,
where the expression in the bracket f g represents the expected total cost
incurred by the retailer when she sells one unit of the product. It thus follows
that the retailers expected prot generated from the sale of each unit of the
product i.e., p   fw + C^()  r[   ^(1  )]g is equal to the ratio of the
demand to the price elasticity of demand (i.e., D(p)=b), which implies that the
price sensitivity of the demand signicantly impacts the retailers pricing decision.
More specically, if the value of b reecting the demands price sensitivity
increases, then D(p)=b may decrease and the retailers expected prot may be
thus reduced. To gain a higher prot, the retailer would hope that the demand
is not sensitivity to the retail price.
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3.2 The Manufacturers Optimal Decisions Given the Re-
tailers Best Response
We now use the retailers best-response decisions given in Theorem 1 to compute
the manufacturers optimal decisions that maximize his prot. Note that the
manufacturer incurs the acquisition cost c to make each unit of the product, and
achieves the sale revenue w when a unit of the product is sold to the retailer. Since
the aggregate demand for the product isD(p) = a bp, as given in Section 3.1, the
manufacturers sale prot can be calculated asD(p)(w c), or, (a bp)(w c).
In addition, as we discuss in Section 3.1, the manufacturer needs to pay the
penalty cost  to the retailer for each returned defect. To assure the manufac-
turers incentive on the quality control, we assume that his unit penalty cost 
is greater than his unit sale prot w   c, i.e.,  > w   c. This assumption is
reasonable because, if   w  c, then the manufacturer can prot from the sale
of each defect. Because the number of defects is r D(p) = r  (a  bp), where
r is the manufacturers decision variable defective rate,as dened previously.
Thus, the manufacturers total penalty cost is   r  (a   bp). Moreover, the
manufacturer needs to dispose all defects returned by the retailer. For example,
the manufacturer may repair or salvage the returned defects. Without loss of gen-
erality, we, hereafter, simply consider the disposingcost for the manufacturer.
Denoting the per defect disposing cost by s, we calculate the manufacturers total
cost of disposing the returned defects as s r  (a  bp).
In order to assure the manufacturers incentive for the quality control, we
should incorporate the manufacturers cost of promising the defective rate r,
which is denoted by C(r). Naturally, in order to reduce the defective rate r, the
manufacturer needs to exert more e¤ort and incur a higher cost for the quality
control. Furthermore, the manufacturers marginal cost C 0(r) should be increas-
ing in r, because it is more di¢ cult for the manufacturer to further reduce a
smaller defective rate r. That is, the cost C(r) is a decreasing, convex function
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of the defective rate r, i.e., C 0(r) < 0 and C 00(r)  0.
Using the above, we can construct the manufacturers prot function as M =
[(w c) (+s)r C(r)](a bp). In the non-cooperative game, the manufacturer
and the retailer act as the leader and the follower, respectively. That is,
the manufacturer should consider the retailers best-response decisions when he
maximizes his prot to nd optimal wholesale price and defective rate. Thus,
for the maximization problem, we need to substitute the retailers best-response
decisions (as given in Theorem 1) into the manufacturers prot function M ,
which is re-written as,
M = [(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)](a  bp). (3)
Theorem 2 Using the retailers best-response decisions given in Theorem 1, we
nd that the manufacturers prot M in (3) is a unimodal function on (w; r) if
and only if C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 where r is the manufacturers optimal defective
rate satisfying the following equation:
s+ ^(1  ) =  C 0(r); (4)
and  satises the equation that C^ 0() = ^r, as given in Theorem 1.
More specically, if the above necessary and su¢ cient condition is satised,
then the manufacturers optimal defective rate r can be uniquely determined by
solving (4), and his optimal wholesale price w can be uniquely obtained as,
w =

+
s
2

r +
a
2b
+
c+ C(r)  C^()  r^(1  )
2
. (5)
Otherwise, if the above condition is not satised, then the manufacturers optimal
solutions may not be unique. 
The above theorem indicates that the uniqueness of the optimal wholesale
price and defective rate depends on the condition that C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 when
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r is attained by solving (25). The necessary and su¢ cient condition implies
that, when the defective rate is increased from the point satisfying the rst-order
condition, the product of the increase in the slope of the manufacturers quality
assurance cost and the increase in the slope of the retailers quality gatekeeping
cost should be larger than ^2. Hereafter, we assume that the cost functions C(r)
and C^() possess the property that C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 at the point r satisfying
(25). For our problem, this assumption is reasonable because of the following fact:
the function C(r) is decreasing and convex in r 2 [0; 1], and C^() is increasing
and convex in  2 [0; 1]. Therefore, if r is increased when it is small, then the
manufacturers e¤ort on the quality assurance is reduced at a large rate; but, if
 is increased when it is small, then the retailers e¤ort is increased at a small
rate. Recalling from the proof of Theorem 2 that @=@r = C^ 00()=^ > 0,
we nd that  satisfying the equation that C^ 0() = ^r is increasing in r.
When r is increased, the retailer should respond by increasing . Note that,
when the value of r is small, the value of  may not be small. Thus, when
r is properly determined as a small value, C 00(r)C^ 00() could be greater than
^2. But, if the value of r is very small, then the value of  could be also very
small and C^ 00() may thus approach zero. As a result, even though C 00(r) is
very large when r is very small, C 00(r)C^ 00() may be smaller than ^2. Hence,
for our problem, the value of r should be determined as in a proper range such
that C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2. In practice, the manufacturer cannot promise a very
small defective rate (e.g., r < 1%) to the retailer, because the corresponding
quality assurance cost is very high; and, the manufacturer cannot determine a
high defective rate (e.g., r < 10%) because he would incur a high penalty cost
and disposing cost for returned defects. Thus, we reasonably assume that the
value of r is properly determined as in, e.g., [1%; 10%].
From Theorem 2, we note that the manufacturers optimal defective rate r
that characterizes his e¤ort on the quality control depends on the retailers
unit defective penalty cost ^, the manufacturers per defect disposing cost s,
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and the retailers best-response identication rate . According to our best-
response analysis for the retailer in Section 3.1, we nd that  is a function of
the value of ^ and the manufacturers defective rate r. It thus follows that the
manufactures optimal defective rate satisfying the equation that s+ ^(1 ) =
 C 0(r) depends on the values of ^ and s. The above reveals an important, and
interesting, result as follows: when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper,
the manufacturers optimal defective rate is independent of his per defect penalty
cost  but dependent on the retailers unit penalty cost ^ and his own cost of
disposing each returned defect. The result occurs because of the following possible
reasons: for each defect, the retailers penalty cost is higher than or the same as
the manufacturers penalty cost; i.e., ^  . The manufacturer should thus treat
^ as an important factor in determining the optimal defective rate, in order to
encourage the retailer to sell his products. Otherwise, the retailer may lose an
incentive to provide the retailing service for the manufacturer.
Moreover, the unit disposing cost s certainly impacts the manufacturers deci-
sion on the defective rate. If the manufacturer incurs a higher cost to dispose the
defect, then he may have an incentive to spend more e¤ort on the quality control
and reduce the defective rate. Note that, as the equation in (4) implies, the man-
ufacturers unit disposing cost s should be smaller than or equal to his optimal
marginal quality-control cost  C 0(r), i.e., s   C 0(r). In fact, if s   C 0(r),
then the manufacturer may desire to reduce his defective rate to zero, because
the disposal of defects is costly. For such a scenario, the retailer does not need
to spend any e¤ort on the quality gatekeeping; and, as a result, her optimal
identication rate becomes zero (i.e.,  = 0) and the manufacturers optimal
defective rate r should be determined such that s =  C 0(r). According to the
above discussion, we nd that  C 0(r)  s  0, which means that the di¤erence
between the manufacturers quality control cost and his disposing cost. Such a
di¤erence can be treated as the manufacturers net quality control cost.
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Corollary 1 The ratio of the manufacturers optimal defective rate (i.e., r) to
the retailers optimal percentage of unidentied defects (i.e., 1   ) is equal
to the ratio of the retailers marginal quality assurance cost [i.e., C^ 0()] to the
manufacturers net quality control cost (i.e.,  [s+ C 0(r)]). That is,
r
1   =
C^ 0()
 [s+ C 0(r)] .
Proof. For a proof of this corollary and the proofs of all subsequent corollaries,
see Appendix C.
The above corollary indicates an interesting result as follows: the manufac-
turers and the retailers optimal relative e¤orts on their quality assurance i.e.,
r=(1  ) should be negatively correlated with their relative marginal quality
control costs i.e., C^ 0()=f [s+C 0(r)]g. That is, if the retailers marginal cost
for her quality assurance i.e., C^ 0() is higher than the manufacturers mar-
ginal cost i.e.,  C 0(r)   s, then the percentage of the defects that cannot be
identied by the retailer (i.e., 1 ) is smaller than the defective rate announced
by the manufacturer (i.e., r). Otherwise, 1     r. This result implies that
a supply chain member with a relatively higher marginal cost for quality assur-
ance may exert an e¤ort to assure fewer defects owing to its downstream or
consumers, which may be surprising.We justify the result as follows: Recall
from Section 3.1 that the retailers quality-gatekeeping cost C^() is an increasing,
convex function of the identication rate , i.e., C^ 0(); C^ 00() > 0. This means
that a high value of the marginal cost C^ 0() implies a high value of . Noting
that the manufacturers quality control cost C(r) is a decreasing, convex function
of its announced defective rate r, i.e., C 0(r) < 0 and C 00(r)  0, we nd that a
low value of the marginal cost  [s+C 0(r)]means a high value of r. Therefore,
if C^ 0() >  C 0(r)   s, then the retailers optimal identication rate  could
be signicantly high and the manufacturers optimal (announced) defective rate
r could be signicantly high. It thus follows that the percentage 1  could be
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smaller than r when C^ 0() >  C 0(r)  s.
3.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium
According to our best-response analysis for the retailer in Section 3.1 and the
optimization analysis for the manufacturer in Section 3.2, we can easily obtain
the Stackelberg equilibrium for the sequential game where the manufacturer and
the retailer act as the leader and the follower, respectively. Specically, we can
nd the Stackelberg equilibrium using the following three stages:
1. We rst nd the manufacturers defective rate rS and the retailers identi-
cation rate S in Stackelberg equilibrium by solving the following equations:
8><>: C^
0(S) = ^rS,
s+ ^(1  S) =  C 0(rS).
(6)
2. We replace r and  in (5) with rS and S, respectively; and, we then
calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized wholesale price wS for
the manufacturer.
3. We use rS, S, and wS to replace r, , and w in (2), respectively, and we
can nd the retailers price in Stackelberg equilibrium pS.
Using rS, S, wS, and pS, we can re-write (2) as,
a
2b
= pS +
rS
2
  w
S
2
  C^(
S) + ^rS(1  S)
2
.
Using the above to replace a=b in (5), we nd that
wS c (+s)rS C(rS) = 2[pS wS C^(S)+^SrS+( ^)rS] = 2D(p
S)
b
, (7)
where the second equation follows our discussion in Section 3.1. According to our
analysis in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, the expression in the bracket [ ]of the RHS
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and the expression in the LHS of (7) mean the retailers and the manufacturers
prot generated from the sale of a unit of the product, respectively. Therefore,
noting that the sales are calculated as D(pS) = a  bpS, we nd from (7) that, in
the sequential game with the retailer as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturer
achieves his prot twice as much as the retailers prot. This important result
implies that the manufacturer benets more from the retailers quality gatekeep-
ing than the retailer. In fact, some existing publications concerning supply chain
analysis also found that, for some cases, the retailers prot may be one half of
the manufacturers prot. For example, Burnetas and Ritchken [3] showed that,
no matter whether or not option contracts are used, the retailers prot always
equals one-half of the manufacturers prot. For other examples, see, e.g., Zhou
et al. [30].
To illustrate the above game analysis, we provide the following numerical
example.
Example 1 Consider a two-echelon supply chain in which a manufacturer and a
retailer serve consumers whose aggregate demand for the manufacturers product
is measured in thousands of units, and is characterized by the linear function
D(p) = a bp with a = 150 and b = 1. For each unit of product, the manufacturer
absorbs the acquisition cost c = $80, and spends an e¤ort to control the quality of
the product with a promised defective rate r to the retailer. If the manufacturer
sells a unit of defect to the retailer who may or may not identify the defect,
then the manufacturer will need to pay a penalty cost $100 to the retailer, i.e.,
 = $100, and he will also have to dispose the defect (e.g., repair or salvage
the defect) at the unit cost s = $10. To assure the quality, the retailer serves
as a gatekeeper to examine the manufacturers product and achieve the defect
identication rate . If the retailer can identify a defect, then she will return it
to the manufacturer and will not experience any loss; but, if the retailer cannot
nd the defect and sells it to a consumer, then the consumer will later return it
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to the retailer, who incurs the penalty cost ^ = $120 even though she can charge
the manufacturer the cost .
As discussed in Section 3.2, the manufacturer incurs the quality control cost
C(r) in order to assure the defective rate r; and similarly, as discussed in Section
3.1, the retailer incurs the quality gatekeeping cost C^() to identify each defect
with the probability . For our numerical study in this paper, we specify the
above two quality control cost functions as,
C(r) = z1 exp( z2r) and C^() = z3 exp(z4), where zi > 0 for i = 1; : : : ; 4,
which satisfy the following properties that are required for our problem: C 0(r) <
0, C 00(r) > 0; and C^ 0() > 0 and C^ 00() > 0. For this numerical example, we set
z1 = 10, z2 = 15, z3 = 0:34, and z4 = 3:2. Noting from Theorem 2 that, to assure
the uniqueness of the manufacturers optimal solutions, we need to examine the
necessary and su¢ cient condition that C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 when r is attained by
solving (25). Using the above parameters, we nd that, if 2% < r < 15%, then
C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 and the Stackelberg equilibrium must be unique.
Next, we compute Stackelberg equilibrium for the manufacturer and the re-
tailer, following the above three-stage method. That is, in the rst stage, we
solve the equations in (6) to calculate the manufacturers defective rate and
the retailers identication rate in Stackelberg equilibrium as rS = 6:67% and
S = 62:34%, respectively. Since rS 2 (2%; 15%), the Stackelberg equilibrium
for the game is unique. In fact, in all subsequent numerical examples, we nd
that the necessary and su¢ cient condition is always satised and Stackelberg
equilibrium for the game with the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort is thus
unique. We will not again examine the uniqueness.
Then, in the second stage, we use (5) to nd the manufacturers Stackelberg
equilibrium-characterized wholesale price as wS = $121:08. In the third stage, we
use (2) to calculate the retailers price in Stackelberg equilibrium as pS = $134:96.
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The above result means that, in equilibrium, the manufacturer rst announces his
wholesale price wS = $121:08 and the defective rate rS = 6:67% to the retailer,
who then determines her identication rate and retail price as S = 62:34% and
pS = $134:96.
It thus follows that the resulting aggregate demand is D(pS) = 1:504  104,
and the manufacturer and the retailer achieve their prots as M = $4:52 105
and R = $2:26 105, respectively. Note that the manufacturers prot is twice
as much as the retailers prot, as shown above. C
4 Impacts of the Retailers Quality Gatekeeping
on the Supply Chain Operation
In this section, we investigate the impacts of the retailers quality assurance on
the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions and their prots. For
such an analysis, we need to nd the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium
decisions when the retailer does not act as a quality gatekeeper. The results are
then compared with those obtained in Section 3 where the retailer is assumed
to assure the quality as a gatekeeper to draw managerial insights regarding
the impacts of the retailers quality control. In addition, we perform analytic and
numerical sensitivity analysis to examine the e¤ects of some important parameters
(e.g.,  and ^) on the supply chain with the retailer as a quality gatekeeper. Next,
we start with the supply chain analysis, assuming that the retailer does not take
the quality gatekeeping role.
4.1 The Game-Theoretic Analysis with No Quality Gate-
keeping of the Retailer
We now assume that the retailer does not exert any e¤ort to assure the quality
as a gatekeeper. Under the assumption, the retailer does not need to determine
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her identication rate as in Section 3. We calculate the manufacturers optimal
decision of wholesale price and defective rate, and compute the retailers sale price.
Similar to Section 3, we next analyze a sequential game, where the manufacturer,
as a leader,rst announces his decisions on the wholesale price and the defective
rate; and the retailer, as a follower,then decides on her retail price.
4.1.1 The Best-Response Analysis for the Retailer who Does Not
Serve as the Quality Gatekeeper
In Section 3.1, we particularly discuss all components in the retailers prot func-
tion when she is involved into the quality assurance as a gatekeeper. Our analysis
in this section di¤ers in the following issue: When the retailer examines the qual-
ity, she can identify some defects with the rate  and thus reduce the defective
rate from the manufacturers promised rate r to (1  )  r. Recalling that the
aggregate price-dependent demand is D(p) = a   bp, we nd that, as a result
of the retailers quality gatekeeping, the number of defects that are sold to con-
sumers is reduced from r (a  bp) to (1  ) r (a  bp) by   r (a  bp).
But, in this section, the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper to assure
the quality. As a consequence, the defective rate faced by consumers is r, which
is determined by the manufacturer.
Therefore, when the retailer does not assure the quality as the gatekeeper, the
retailers resulting prot R as her prot (p  w)D(p) minus her penalty cost
^  r  D(p) plus the manufacturers penalty   r  D (which is paid to the
retailer); i.e., R = (p w)D(p)+( ^)rD(p) = D(p)[(p w)+( ^)r],
or,
R = (a  bp) [(p  w) + (  ^) r], (8)
where the retailer only has one decision variable retail price p. Note that, dif-
ferent from Section 3.1 where R and M denote the retailers and the manufac-
turers prots, respectively, we use R and M to represent the two supply chain
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membersprots.
Theorem 3 Suppose that, in the two-echelon supply chain, the retailer does
not serve as the quality gatekeeper. When the manufacturers wholesale price w
and defective rate r are given, we nd that the retailers optimal retail price p
maximizing R in (8) can be uniquely obtained as,
p =
1
2
ha
b
+ w   r(  ^)
i
.  (9)
In the above theorem, the bar symbol ( ) indicates the optimal retail price
in the case that the retailer does not act as a quality gatekeeper. Similarly, we
write all sequential optimal solutions with the bar symbol, in order to distinguish
between them and those in Section 3.1. We re-write (9) as follows: p = [w  
r(  ^)]+D(p)=b, where the expression in the bracket ([ ]) means the retailers
cost for each unit of the product. Therefore, the retailers best-response retail
price given in (9) is her cost plus the unit prot D(p)=b, which is the ratio
of the demand to the price elasticity of demand. The result is similar to that in
Section 3.1 where, when the retailer acts as the quality gatekeeper, the retailers
unit prot is D(p)=b, where p = fa=b + w + C^()   r[   ^(1   )]g=2 as
given in (2).
Corollary 2 Given the manufacturers wholesale price w and defective rate r,
we compare the retailers unit prot when she serves as the quality gatekeeper
with that when she does not implement the quality gatekeeping. We nd that,
if C^() < ^r, then the retailers gatekeeping reduces the retail price (i.e.,
p < p), and the retailer thus serves more demands [i.e., D(p) > D(p)] and
enjoys a higher unit prot [i.e., D(p)=b > D(p)=b]. Otherwise, if C^()  ^r,
then the retailers quality assurance increases or does not change the retail price
(i.e., p  p), and thus, the retailer serves less or the same demands [i.e., D(p) 
D(p)] and enjoys a lower or the same unit prot [i.e., D(p)=b  D(p)=b]. 
29
As the above corollary indicates, whether or not the retailer should reduce
her price as a result of serving as the quality gatekeeper is dependent on the
comparison between her quality gatekeeping cost C^() which is absorbed by
the retailer during the inspection of each product to achieve the identication rate
 and the term ^r. Noting that ^ is the unit penalty cost by the retailer and
r is the manufacturers defective rate, we nd that ^r represents the expected
reduction in the retailers penalty cost for each product. Therefore, C^() and
^r can be regarded as the retailers investmenton the quality gatekeeping
and gaingenerated from the gatekeeping. If the retailers investment is smaller
than her gain (i.e., C^() < ^r), then the gatekeeping is worth implementing
and the retailer is thus willing to reduce her price and attract consumers.
4.1.2 TheManufacturers Optimal Decisions Given the Best Response
of the Retailer with No Quality Gatekeeping
We now nd the manufacturers optimal wholesale price and defective rate that
maximize his prot, using the retailers best-response decision as given in Theo-
rem 3. Note that, no matter whether or not the retailer acts as the quality gate-
keeper, the manufacturers prot is calculated as his sales revenue (w  c)D(p)
minus the sum of his penalty cost rD(p), his defect-disposal cost srD(p),
and his quality assurance cost C(r)D(p). Therefore, when the retailer does not
spend any e¤ort on the quality assurance, the manufacturers prot is obtained
as, M = [(w  c)  (+s)r C(r)]D(p), which is the same as M in (3) when
the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper.
Theorem 4 For the sequential game with no quality assurance by the retailer,
we use the retailers best-response retail price is p as given in (9) to nd that
the manufacturers prot M is jointly concave on (w; r). The optimal defective
rate r uniquely satises the following equation:
s+ ^ =  C 0(r); (10)
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and the optimal wholesale price w can be uniquely computed as,
w = r +
1
2
ha
b
+ c+ C(r) + (s  ^)r
i
.  (11)
From the above theorem, we learn that, when the retailer does not serve as
the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers optimal defective rate r and optimal
w wholesale price can be both uniquely determined by solving the equations
in (10) and (11), respectively. Moreover, r only is dependent on the retailers
per defect penalty cost ^, the manufacturers defect-disposing cost s, and the
manufacturers quality assurance cost function C(). Similar to our analysis in
Section 3.2, we nd that, when the retailer does not serve as the quality gate-
keeper, the manufacturers optimal defective rate does not depend on his per
defect penalty cost  but only depends on the retailers unit penalty cost ^ and
the manufacturers disposal cost s, possibly because ^  .
Next, we examine the impacts of the retailers gatekeeping on the manufac-
turers optimal decisions. From (4) and (10), we note that, when the retailer
serves as a gatekeeper, the manufacturers optimal defective rate r uniquely sat-
ises the equation that s + ^(1   ) =  C 0(r); but, when the retailer does
not assure the quality, the manufacturers optimal defective rate is r, which
can be uniquely obtained by solving the equation that s + ^ =  C 0(r). Since
0    1, we nd that  C 0(r)   C 0(r), or, C 0(r)  C 0(r). Recall from
Section 3.2 that the manufacturers quality assurance cost C(r) is decreasing and
convex, i.e., C 0(r) < 0 and C 00(r)  0. It thus follows that r  r. That is, as
a result of the retailers quality gatekeeping, the manufacture raises his defective
rate that is announced to the retailer. This result may be justied as follows: as
the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, the rate of the defects sold to con-
sumers is reduced. Thus, the manufacturer may respond by reducing his e¤ort
on the quality control.
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In addition, we learn from (5) and (11) that, if the retailer acts as the
gatekeeper, then the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w is uniquely ob-
tained as w = r + [a=b + c + C(r)   C^()   r^(1   ) + sr]=2; other-
wise, the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w is uniquely found as w =
r + [a=b+ c+ C(r) + (s  ^)r]=2. Then, we have,
w   w = =2 = (1   2)=2 (12)
where 8><>: 1  r
^   C^()  (^  )(r   r),
2  [(s+ )r + C(r)]  [(s+ )r + C(r)].
(13)
In (13), ^r and C^() are the retailers penalty cost reduction generated by
identifying one unit of defect and the retailers unit quality-gatekeeping cost,
respectively. Moreover, in (13), (^   )(r   r) is explained as the maximum
unit penalty cost incurred by the retailer due to the sale of a defect, because
of the following fact: we learn from Section 3.1 that, if the retailer sells a unit
of defect, then she incurs the penalty cost ^ but charges the manufacturer the
penalty cost  (  ^). Thus, the term (^  ) means the retailers net penalty
cost per defect. In addition, r and r (r > r, as discussed previously) are
the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium defective rates with and without the
retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. Noting that the retailers defect identication rate
is  (as the quality gatekeeper) and the defective rate faced by consumers is
r(1   ) where 0    1, we nd that the term (rS   rS) represents the
retailers maximum defective rate. It thus follows that (^   )(rS   rS) is the
maximum unit penalty cost that the retailer incurs when she sells a defect.
In addition, we note that (s + )r + C(r) [(s + )r + C(r)] means the
manufacturers per unit total cost for quality assurance (i.e., the defective penalty
cost and the quality control cost) when the retailer does not serve [serves] as the
quality gatekeeper. Therefore, the terms 1 and 2 in (13) are explained as the
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retailers and the manufacturers per unit quality-related cost savings (reductions)
generated by the retailers quality gatekeeping, respectively. Note that each of
1 and 2 may be positive or may be negative. If 1 < 0, then  1 is the
retailers unit cost increment; and, if 2 < 0, then 2 is the manufacturers unit
cost increment.
According to the above, we conclude that, when the retailer acts as the quality
gatekeeper, the manufacturer may increase his wholesale price, which depends on
the comparison between the manufacturers and the retailers cost savings result-
ing from the retailers gatekeeping. More specically, if the retailers cost savings
are higher than the reduction in the manufacturers quality-related cost i.e.,
1 > 2, then the manufacturer should raise his wholesale price; otherwise, the
manufacturer should maintain or decrease the wholesale price. The result indi-
cates that the manufacturers wholesale pricing decision is associated with his
own and the retailers benets from the quality assurance, because the manu-
facturer with a low cost reduction may desire to increase his wholesale price to
sharethe retailers cost savings.
Furthermore, we nd that  in (12) actually denotes the di¤erent between the
retailers and the manufacturers per unit cost savings as a result of the retailers
quality gatekeeping. Note that, if  > 0, then the retailers cost reduction is
higher than the manufacturers cost reduction; if  = 0, then the retailer and the
manufacturer enjoy the same cost reduction; and, if  < 0, then the retailer has
a lower cost reduction. It thus follows that the increase in the manufacturers
optimal wholesale price is a half of the di¤erence between the retailers and the
manufacturers unit cost savings. This implies that the manufacturer may in-
tend to obtain a part of the retailers cost savings through his wholesale pricing
decision.
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4.1.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium for the Game with No Quality Gate-
keeping of the Retailer
We now use the retailers best-response solution and the manufacturers optimal
decisions to nd the two supply chain membersStackelberg equilibrium decisions.
Similar to Section 3.3 where the retailer assures the quality as the gatekeeper, we
can nd the equilibrium through the following three stages: In Stage 1, we solve
the equation in (10) to nd the manufacturers defective rate rS in Stackelberg
equilibrium. In Stage 2, we substitute rS into the equation in (11), and calculate
the equilibrium wholesale price wS for the manufacturer. In Stage 3, we replace
r and w in (9) with rS and wS, respectively, and obtain the retailers Stackelberg
equilibrium retail price pS.
Next, we compare the manufacturers and the retailers prots when the two
supply chain members choose their decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium. Noting
that each rms prot is calculated as the aggregate demand D(pS) times the
rms unit prot, we need to compare the manufacturers unit prot [i.e., ( wS  
c)  (s+)rS  C(rS)] with the retailers unit prot [i.e., (pS   wS)+ (  ^)rS].
Substituting rS and wS into (9), we nd that pS  wS+rS( ^) =  pS+a=b =
D(pS)=b, which means that the retailers unit prot is D(pS)=b, as discussed in
Section 4.1.1. Then, using rS and wS to replace r and w in (10) and (11),
respectively, we have the manufacturers unit prot as,
wS   c  (s+ )rS   C(rS) = a
b
  wS   srS + rS(  ^),
which is greater than the retailers unit prot pS   wS + rS(   ^), if and only
if a=b   srS > pS or D(pS)=b > srS. The di¤erence between the manufacturers
and the retailers unit prots is computed as,
[ wS   c  (s+ )rS   C(rS)]  [pS   wS + rS(  ^)] = D(p
S)
b
  srS. (14)
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Because the retailers unit prot is D(pS)=b, we nd that, if the retailer does not
serve as the quality gatekeeper, then the manufacturers unit prot is smaller
than double of the retailers unit prot, and thus the manufacturers total prot
is also smaller than double of the retailers total prot. This result is di¤erent
from that when the retailer acts as the quality gatekeeper.
We learn from the above result and the result in Section 3.3 that, when the
retailer spends an e¤ort on the quality gatekeeping, the ratio of the manufacturers
prot to the retailers prot is increased. This means that the retailers quality
gatekeeping e¤ort leads the manufacturer to make a higher prot compared with
the retailer. Furthermore, comparing the above and our analysis in Section 3, we
draw some important insights as given in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 The impacts of the retailers quality gatekeeping on the manufac-
turers and the retailers equilibrium decisions and prots are found as follows:
1. The manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium defective rate rS when the re-
tailer serves as the quality gatekeeper is higher than the rate rS when the
retailer does not take the gatekeeper role.
2. If, as a result of the retailers gatekeeping, the retailers unit cost savings
1 [as given in (13)] are larger than the manufacturers unit cost reduction
2 [also, as given in (13)], then the wholesale price wS for the game with
the retailers gatekeeping is higher than the price wS for the game with no
gatekeeping by the retailer, i.e., wS > wS. Otherwise, wS  wS.
3. The impacts of the retailers gatekeeping on the equilibrium retail price,
and the resulting demand and prots of two supply chain members are
dependent on the value of S1 + 
S
2 , where8><>: 
S
1  rS^S   C^(S)  (^  )(rS   rS),
S2  [(s+ )rS + C(rS)]  [(s+ )rS + C(rS)].
(15)
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(a) If S1+
S
2 > 0 , then the retailers equilibrium price p
S when the retailer
serves as the gatekeeper is smaller than her equilibrium price pS when
the retailer does not serve as the gatekeeper, i.e., pS < pS. As a result,
the demand D(pS) is greater than D(pS), i.e., D(pS) > D(pS); and,
the retailers prot with her gatekeeping e¤ort is higher than those
with no gatekeeping.
(b) If S1 + 
S
2 = 0, then the retailers quality does not a¤ect the man-
ufacturers and the retailers equilibrium pricing decisions, and the
resulting demands and prots of the two supply chain members.
(c) If S1 +
S
2 < 0, then p
S > pS, D(pS) < D(pS), and the retailer is worse
o¤ due to the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. 
We learn from Section 3.3 that, when the retailer serves as the quality gate-
keeper, the manufacturers and the retailers unit prots are 2  D(pS)=b and
D(pS)=b, respectively; thus, their total prots are calculated as 2  [D(pS)]2=b
and [D(pS)]2=b. When the retailer does not exert any gatekeeping e¤ort, we nd
that the retailers total prot is [D(pS)]2=b but the manufacturers total prot is
smaller than 2  [D(pS)]2=b. Therefore, we nd that, if S1 + S2 > 0, then the
retailer enjoy higher prots from the retailers gatekeeping but the manufacturer
may not benet. Otherwise, their prots may be lower than or the same as those
when the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper.
We nd that S1 + 
S
2 in Theorem 5 means the supply chain-wide unit cost
reduction that is induced by the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. If the man-
ufacturer and the retailer can jointly achieve a positive cost reduction as a result
of the retailers quality gatekeeping, then the retailer are better o¤ than when the
retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper, which happens possibly because
of the following reason: When the supply chain-wide cost savings are positive, the
retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort results in a lower retail price, a larger demand,
and a higher prot for the retailer. This reects the retailers contributionto
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the supply chain.
Note from our discussions in Section 3.3 and this section that, with the re-
tailers gatekeeping e¤ort, the retailers unit prot is D(pS)=b; and, without the
retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, the retailers unit prot is D(pS)=b. Next, for the
retailer, we compute the Lerner index which is a well-known index reecting
a rms market power; see Lerner [16] the ratio of the retailers unit prot to
the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium price. When the retailer assures the
quality with her gatekeeping e¤ort, her Lerner index is a=(bpS)  1, respectively.
When the retailer is not involved into the quality assurance, the retailers index is
a=(bpS) 1. As Theorem 5 indicates, if the supply chain can enjoy a higher prot
as a result of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, i.e., S1 + 
S
2 > 0, then p
S < pS
and the retailers Lerner index is higher than that without the retailers e¤ort.
However, since the manufacturers prot may or may not be increased when the
retailer is involved into the quality assurance, we cannot analytically determine
if the manufacturers Lerner index rises as a consequence of the retailers quality
assurance.
According to the above, we summarize our managerial insights as in the fol-
lowing remark.
Remark 1 When the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturer
would exert less e¤ort on the quality control and his defective rate is thus in-
creased. But, the manufacturer may or may not increase his wholesale price,
which depends on whether or not his cost reduction is greater than the retailers
cost savings.
Even though the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort results in a higher defective rate,
the retailer may still benet, which depends on whether or not the supply chain
can enjoy a positive cost reduction. If the supply chain-wide cost savings result
from the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, then the retailer reduces her retail price and
the resulting demand is higher. As a consequence, the retailers prot is higher
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than when the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper. Moreover, the
retailers market power is stronger when the retailer implements the gatekeeping.
Otherwise, if the supply chain cannot benet from the retailers quality assurance,
then the retail price is increased; and, the retailer is worse o¤ because her prot
and market power are both reduced. The interesting result reveals that the
retailers pricing decision relies on the impact of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort
on the supply chain-wide prot rather than only the retailers own prot. C
To illustrate our above analysis, we provide a numerical example below.
Example 2 We re-consider Example 1 but assume that the retailer does not
exert any e¤ort to identify the defect. Using the three-stage approach, we solve
the corresponding sequential game to nd the manufacturers and the retailers
decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium as follows: the manufacturer determines and
announces his defective rate rS = 0:95% and wholesale price wS = $119:76 to the
retailer; and then, the retailer decides to choose her retail price pS = $134:98. As a
result, if the retailer does not act as the quality gatekeeper, then the manufacturer
and the retailer can enjoy the prots M = $4:514 105 and R = $2:257 105,
respectively; and the resulting aggregate demand is D(pS) = 1:502 104.
When we compare the above results with those given in Example 1 (in which
the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper), we note that pS > pS, D(pS) <
D(pS), M < M , and R < R. This means that both the manufacturer and the
retailer are worse o¤ due to the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. We calculate
the retailers unit cost reduction (induced by her gatekeeping) as S1 = $1:34 and
the manufacturers unit cost reduction as S2 =  $1:29; thus, the supply chain-
wide unit cost reduction is S1 + 
S
2 = $0:05, which implies that the whole supply
chains cost is reduced by $0:05 for each product when the retailer is involved into
the quality assurance as the gatekeeper. It thus follows from Theorem 5 that the
retail price decreases, the aggregate demand increases, and the manufacturers
and the retailers prots are both increased.
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Next, we present another example to illustrate the case that the manufacturer
and the retailer cannot benet from the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. We still con-
sider Example 1 but change the value of z3 i.e., a parameter in the retailers unit
quality-gatekeeping cost function from 0.34 to 0.38. Other parameter values in
Example 1 remain. For the sequential games with and without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤orts, we compute the manufacturers and the retailers Stackel-
berg equilibrium decisions and corresponding prots, and calculate the aggregate
demands and the supply chain-wide unit cost reductions (S1 + 
S
2 ), which are
given as in Table 1. We learn from Table 1 that, as the retailer serves the supply
chain as the quality gatekeeper, she increases her retail price and the resulting
demand is lower than when she does not acts as the gatekeeper. This occurs
because the supply chain-wide unit cost reduction (S1 + 
S
2 ) is negative. As a
consequence, both the manufacturer and the retailer cannot enjoy higher prots
and benet from the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. C
Stackelberg Equilibrium Decisions and Other Results
Supply Chain
Member
Game with the
Retailers Gatekeeping
Game without the
Retailers Gatekeeping
Manufacturer Wholesale price wS = $120:26 Wholesale price wS = $119:76
Defective rate rS = 5:23% Defective rate rS = 0:95%
Prot M = $4:48 105 Prot M = $4:514 105
Retailer Identication rate S = 51:28% 
Retail price pS = $135:03 Retail price pS = $134:98
Prot R = $2:24 105 Prot R = $2:257 105
Supply Chain Demand D(pS) = 1:497 104 Demand D(pS) = 1:502 104
Performance Supply chain-wide unit quality-related cost reduction S1 + 
S
2 =  $0:198
Table 1: The manufacturers and the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium decisions
and corresponding prots, and the aggregate demands and the supply chain-
wide unit cost reductions for the sequential games with and without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤orts.
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4.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Analytic and Numerical Results
We now perform sensitivity analysis to investigate the impacts of all important
parameters on the manufacturers and the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium deci-
sions, the resulting aggregate demand, and two supply chain membersprots. If
we cannot analytically nd the impacts of a parameter, then we use the value of
the parameter in Example 1 as the base values for our sensitivity analysis that
is, to examine the impact of the parameter, we vary its value but keep other
parametersbase values unchanged. From our previous game analysis, we nd
that all parameters in the manufacturers and the retailers prot functions may
signicantly a¤ect the Stackelberg equilibrium and the supply chain performance.
Thus, we accordingly consider all parameters that are classied into the follow-
ing four categories: (i) defect penalty costs (i.e.,  and ^); (ii) acquisition and
disposing costs (i.e., c and s); (iii) demand parameters (i.e., a and b); and (iv)
quality-assurance cost parameters (i.e., zi, for i = 1; : : : ; 4).
Next, we present our results for the sensitivity analysis in each category, and
draw managerial insights that expose the impacts of the retailers quality gate-
keeping e¤ort on supply chain operations.
4.2.1 Defect Penalty Costs
We consider the sensitivity analysis of the manufacturers unit defect penalty
cost  and the retailers unit defect penalty cost ^. The analysis is important
because, as indicated by our discussion in Sections 3 and 4.1, the two parame-
ters signicantly a¤ect the manufacturers and the retailers decisions and their
prots. Next, we begin by discussing the impacts of  on Stackelberg equilibrium-
based decisions and the resulting prots for the supply chain, which shall be then
followed by the discussion on the impacts of ^ on the supply chain operations.
Impacts of the Manufacturers Unit Defect Penalty Cost  We rst
investigate how the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions change
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when we vary the value of . From Section 3.3 we learn that, when the retailer acts
as a quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium defective rate
rS and the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium identication rate S can be attained
by solving the following two equations [that are given in (6)]: C^ 0(S) = ^rS and
s + ^(1   S) =  C 0(rS). It follows that both rS and S are independent of
. That is, any change in the value of  does not impact the manufacturers
and the retailers equilibrium decisions for their quality assurance. In addition,
we nd from Section 4.1.3 that, when the retailer is not involved into the quality
gatekeeping, we need to solve s+^ =  C 0(rS) to nd the manufacturers defective
rate rS in Stackelberg equilibrium, which is also independent of . Note that
we consider the decision variable  for the retailer only when she serves as a
gatekeeper.
The above indicates that, with and without the retailers quality gatekeeping
e¤ort, the manufacturers and the retailers decisions for their quality assurance
are independent of . Next, we examine the impacts of  on Stackelberg equilib-
rium wholesale and retail pricing decisions.
Theorem 6 When the manufacturers unit defect penalty cost  is increased by
one dollar, the manufacturer will increase his wholesale price wS by rS dollars if
the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper but he will increase the wholesale price
wS by rS dollars if the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper. But, with
and without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, the retailers retail pricing
decision is independent of . As a result, the demand, and the two supply chain
membersprots are also independent of . 
From the above theorem, we nd that only wholesale price is dependent on
the value of the manufacturers unit penalty cost . Recalling Theorem 5 that
the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort results in the rise of the manufacturers defective
rate, i.e., rS > rS, we nd that, as the value of  is increased by one dollar,
the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium wholesale price wS (when the retailer
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serves as the gatekeeper) increases at a higher rate than his wholesale price wS
(when the retailer does not serve as the gatekeeper). That is, when the retailer
is involved into the quality assurance, the manufacturer should respond to the
rise in his penalty cost by increasing the wholesale price at a high rate. This
result may be justied as follows: if the manufacturer incurs a higher penalty
cost for each defect returned by the retailer, then he could naturally increase his
wholesale price. When the retailer spends her quality-gatekeeping e¤ort, she will
identify some defects that are not sold to consumers but are instead returned to
the manufacturer. For these defects, the retailer does not need to absorb any
penalty cost for the sale of defects; this means that the retailers penalty cost is
smaller compared with the case that the retailer does not spend any e¤ort on the
quality assurance. It may thus follow that, as the value of  rises, the wholesale
price with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort should be increased at a higher rate
than that without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort.
Impacts of the Retailers Unit Defect Penalty Cost ^ We now perform
sensitivity analysis of the retailers unit defect penalty cost ^ to investigate how
the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions and resulting prots
vary when the retailer incurs a di¤erent penalty cost generated by selling one unit
of defect to consumers. Note from our analysis of  (in the preceding section) that
Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized wholesale price wS is dependent on both
 and ^, and other Stackelberg equilibrium-based decisions (i.e., rS; S; pS) are
independent of  but dependent on ^. That is, the value of ^ more signicantly
a¤ects the supply chain than the value of .
As discussed previously, when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper,
the manufacturers defective rate rS and the retailers identication rate S in
Stackelberg equilibrium satisfy the following two equations: C^ 0(S) = ^rS and
s + ^(1  S) =  C 0(rS), which can be solved to attain S and rS that are two
functions in terms of ^. But, it would be intractable to nd the impacts of ^
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on S and rS, because of the following reason: we di¤erentiate both the left-
and the right-hand sides of the above two equations once w.r.t. ^, and nd that
C^ 00(S)(@S=@^) = rS+^(@rS=@^) and (1 S) ^(@S=@^) =  C 00(rS)
(@rS=@^), which can be solved to attain @S=@^ and @rS=@^. However, we
cannot determine the signs of @S=@^ and @rS=@^, and cannot analytically nd
the impacts of ^ on S and rS. Thus, similarly, we cannot analytically examine
the impacts of ^ on the Stackelberg equilibrium-based wholesale and retail prices,
and the resulting prots of the manufacturer and the retailer.
Next, we conduct a numerical study to perform our sensitivity analysis in
which we vary the value of ^ around its base value given in Example 1 where ^ =
$120 per defect; and, for each value, we compute the corresponding equilibrium
decisions and prots for the manufacturer and the retailer. Since, in this paper,
the retailer may or may not be involved into the quality assurance, we present
our results for the case with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort and the case without
the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. More specically, noting that ^   = 100,
we, ceteris paribus, increase the value of ^ from 100 to 145 in steps of 5; for
each value of ^, we calculate the Stackelberg equilibrium (rS; wS; S; pS) for the
game in which the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper and also compute the
Stackelberg equilibrium (rS; wS; pS) for the game in which the retailer does not
serve as the quality gatekeeper. In addition, for each value of ^, we compute the
manufacturers and the retailers prots (M ;R) for the game with the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort and their prots (M ; R) for the game without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort. For our numerical results, see Table 3 in Appendix D. To
facilitate our discussion, we plot Figure 3 to show the impacts of ^.
From Figure 3(a), we note that, when the retailer is involved into the quality
assurance with a higher penalty cost per defect, she should determine a higher
identication rate S and the manufacturer should determine a lower defective
rate rS. This result may be justied as follows: as the value of ^ rises, the
retailer incurs a higher penalty cost when she sells one unit of defect to con-
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Figure 3: The impacts of the retailers unit defect penalty cost ^ on the Stackel-
berg equilibrium (rS; wS; S; pS) and the manufacturers and the retailers prots
(M ;R) for the game with the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, and also
on the Stackelberg equilibrium (rS; wS; pS) and the two supply chain members
prots (M ; R) for the game without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort.
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sumers. This may result in an increase in the retail price pS as indicated by
Figure 3(b) and a reduction in the demand. Moreover, to reduce the penalty
cost payment, the retailer may spend more e¤ort on the quality gatekeeping and
assure a higher identication rate. As a result, before selling the products to
consumers, the retailer returns more defects to the manufacturer and without
absorbing any penalty cost for these returned defects. The manufacturer may
respond to the retailers increasing gatekeeping e¤ort by reducing his defective
rate and thus saving his penalty cost for the quality assurance. In addition, Fig-
ure 3(a) indicates that, if the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper
and her per defect penalty cost ^ is increased, then the manufacturer reduces his
defective rate, possibly because of the following reason: since the retailer does
not spend any e¤ort to reduce the number of defectives that are sold to con-
sumers, a higher penalty cost for each defect may lead the retailer to increase his
retail price pS, which is demonstrated by Figure 3(b). But, this may discourage
consumers from buying from the retailer. To reduce the retailers payment for
the defect sales and mitigate the price increase, the manufacturer may intend to
exert more e¤ort on reducing the defective rate. Recall from Theorem 5 that the
Stackelberg equilibrium-based defective rate with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort
(rS) is higher than that without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort (rS), which is
demonstrated by Figure 3(a).
We also learn from Figure 3(b) that, as the value of ^ increases, the retailer
raises her retail price, no matter whether or not the retailer serves as the quality
gatekeeper. Furthermore, when the retailer is involved into the quality assurance,
the rate of the increase in the retail price is larger than that without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort. This results reveals that the retailer intends to increase her
retail price at a higher rate so as to o¤set her cost for the quality gatekeeping. In
addition, we nd that, when ^ is su¢ ciently small (e.g., ^ < 120), the retail price
without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort (i.e., pS) is higher than that with the
e¤ort (i.e., pS); but, when ^ is su¢ ciently large (e.g., ^ > 125), pS < pS. Recall
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from Theorem 5 that the comparison between pS and pS depends on the sign of
S1 + 
S
2 which means the supply chain-wide unit cost reduction that is induced
by the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. That is, if the retailers gatekeeping
e¤ort can reduce the supply chain-wide cost, then the retailer decides to reduce
her price, i.e., pS > pS. The above result as shown in Figure 3(b) implies that
the entire supply chain benets from a small value of ^ but it is worse o¤ from
a high value of ^. It thus follows that the retailer should assure the quality as
a gatekeeper if her penalty cost per defect is small; otherwise, she should not be
involved into the quality assurance.
Figure 3(b) indicates that, as the value of ^ rises, the manufacturer reduces
his wholesale price wS if the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper; but, he
increases his wholesale price wS if the retailer does not serve as the gatekeeper.
As discussed above, when the retailer acts as the quality gatekeeper, an increase
in the value of ^ leads the retailer to raise her price at a large rate, which may
reduce the sales of the manufacturers products. To mitigate such an impact, the
manufacturer would reduce his wholesale price to o¤set the retailers cost increase
and thus encourage the retailer to assure the quality as a gatekeeper. However, if
the retailer does not act as the quality gatekeeper, then the manufacturer cannot
gain any benet from the retailer for the quality assurance. Therefore, when the
retailer raises his price as a result of an increase in the value of ^, the demand
may be reduced and the manufacturer may respond by increasing his wholesale
price to guarantee the prot. Moreover, we observe that the di¤erence between
wS and wS is reduced when the value of ^ is increased, because of the following
possible reason: the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort with a larger value of ^ decrease
the supply chain-wide benet in terms of cost reduction.
We nd from Figure 3(c) that, with and without the retailers e¤ort on the
quality assurance, the manufacturers prot is higher than the retailers prot, as
shown in Section 4.1.3. In addition, both the manufacturers and the retailers
prots are decreasing in ^, which demonstrates that a higher value of ^ deteri-
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orates the supply chain performance and discourages the retailers participation
in the quality assurance. Moreover, as discussed previously, the retailers quality
gatekeeping e¤ort with a su¢ ciently small value of ^ can result in the supply
chain-wide cost reduction, whereas the retailers e¤ort with a su¢ ciently large
value of ^ cannot reduce the chain-wide cost. As a consequence, Figure 3(c) in-
dicates that, when ^ < 120, both the manufacturer and the retailer benet from
the retailers quality assurance by enjoying higher prots; but, when ^ > 125, the
two supply chain membersprots when the retailer serves as the quality gate-
keeper are smaller than those when the retailer does not serve as the gatekeeper.
Furthermore, we nd from Figure 3(d) that, when the value of ^ is su¢ ciently
small (i.e., ^ < 120 ), the supply chain-wide prot when the retailer spends e¤ort
on the quality assurance (i.e., M +R) is higher than that without the retailers
quality gatekeeping (i.e., M+R). This means that, if the retailers unit penalty
cost ^ is small, then the quality gatekeeping at the retailing level will raise the
supply chain-wide prot.
4.2.2 Acquisition and Disposing Costs
We now examine the impacts of the manufacturers unit acquisition cost (i.e.,
c) and his cost of disposing a returned defect (i.e., s). Since c and s are two
important cost components in the manufacturers objective (prot) function, it
is important to discuss how the two parameters a¤ects the manufacturers equi-
librium decisions and the entire supply chains performance. We start with the
sensitivity analysis of the acquisition cost c.
Impacts of the Manufacturers Unit Acquisition Cost c We now consider
how the manufacturer and the retailer change their equilibrium decisions when
the manufacturer incurs a di¤erent acquisition cost. According to Sections 3.3
and 4.1.3, we nd that, when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, the
manufacturers defective rate rS and the retailers identication rate S in Stack-
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elberg equilibrium are dependent on ^, s, and the cost functions C() and C^();
and when the retailer does not act as the gatekeeper, the manufacturers equilib-
rium defective rate rS is similarly dependent on ^, s, and the cost function C().
Therefore, with and without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, the manu-
facturers and the retailers quality assurance-related decisions are independent
of the manufacturers unit acquisition cost c.
Next, we analyze the impacts of the value of c on the two supply chain mem-
bersequilibrium pricing decisions and resulting prots.
Theorem 7 When the manufacturers acquisition cost c is increased by one dol-
lar, we nd that, no matter whether or not the retailer serves as the quality
gatekeeper, the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized wholesale
price is always increased by a half of one dollar and the retailers equilibrium
price is always increased by a quarter of one dollar. Moreover, an increase in the
acquisition cost c results in a reduction of the aggregate demand for both the
game with and the game without the retailers e¤ort on the quality assurance.
When the value of c is increased for the game with or without the retailers
quality gatekeeping e¤ort, the manufacturers and the retailers prots are both
decreased. In addition, the reduction in the manufacturers prot is greater than
the reduction in the retailers prot. 
The above theorem indicates that the impacts of c on the Stackelberg equi-
librium decisions do not di¤er between the game with and the game without the
retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. This means that the involvement of the re-
tailer into the quality assurance does not a¤ect the supply chain operations and
performance. In addition, as discussed previously, the value of c does not a¤ect
the quality assurance-related equilibrium decisions i.e., the defective rate rS and
the identication rate S for the game with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort and
the defective rate rS for the game without the retailers gatekeeping.
However, we nd that, as the value of c rises, the two supply chain members
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raise their prices to o¤set the cost increase. Note that the increase in the wholesale
price is twice as much as the increase in the retail price, which implies that the
retailer bears a half of the increase in the wholesale price, and the other half is
included in the retail price and thus absorbed by consumers. If the value of c is
higher, then both the manufacturers and the retailers prots are lower and they
are worse o¤. Furthermore, the reduction in the manufacturers prot is larger
that the reduction in the retailers prot. That is, a higher value of c deteriorates
the two supply chain membersprots, and makes the manufacturer worse than
the retailer.
Impacts of the Manufacturers Unit Disposing Cost s We now conduct
the sensitivity analysis of the unit cost s that the manufacturer incurs when he
disposes each defect returned by the retailer. The impacts of the value of s are
investigated to address the question of how the manufacturer and the retailer
change their decisions if the manufacturers disposing cost varies. Next, we begin
by analyzing the impacts of s on the quality assurance-related decisions, which
are the manufacturers defective rate and the retailers identication rate.
Theorem 8 As the manufacturers unit defect-disposing cost s is increased, we
nd that, for both the game with and the game without the retailers quality
gatekeeping e¤ort, the manufacturers defective rate in Stackelberg equilibrium is
always decreased. Moreover, when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper,
her identication rate is also decreasing in s. 
From the above theorem, we learn that, as the manufacturer incurs a higher
cost to dispose the returned defects, he may respond by spending more e¤ort
on the quality assurance and reducing the defective rate, in order to dispose less
defects. Since the manufacturer promises a low defective rate to the retailer,
the retailer may have less incentive to assure the quality as a gatekeeper. As a
consequence, the retailers identication rate is reduced as the value of s increases.
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Moreover, we nd that whether or not the retailer is involved into the quality
assurance does not a¤ect the impacts of s on the two supply chain members
quality assurance-related decisions.
Next, we consider the impacts of s on the Stackelberg equilibrium pricing
decisions and the resulting prots in the supply chain. Since it is intractable
to analytically conduct such a sensitivity analysis with the retailers gatekeeping
e¤ort, we have to perform a numerical study to investigate the dependence of
wS and pS (and the corresponding prots) on the value of s. But, when the
retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper, we can analyze the impacts of s
on the Stackelberg equilibrium prices ( wS and pS) and the corresponding prots
without doing any numerical study. We begin by providing our analytic results
for the game without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, which is then followed by
our numerical results regarding the sensitivity analysis for both the game with
and the game without the retailers gatekeeper role.
Theorem 9 For the game without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, we
nd that, as the manufacturers cost of disposing each defect returned by the
retailer is increased, both the manufactures wholesale price and the retailers
retail price rise. In addition, the two supply chain membersprots are both
decreasing in the value of s. 
As the above theorem indicates, the manufacturer and the retailer respond
to the increase in the value of s by raising their prices; as a result, their prots
are decreased as the value of s rises. Due to intractable complexity of analyzing
the impacts of s for the game with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, we now
provide a numerical study where we vary the value of s around its base value
(i.e., s = $10) given in Example 1 and compute the corresponding wholesale and
retail prices and resulting prots for the game with the retailers gatekeeper role.
Even though, from Theorem 9, we can learn the impacts of s when the retailer
does not act as the gatekeeper, we still provide our numerical results for the case
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because we shall demonstrate our analytic results and compare the results with
the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort with those without the gatekeeping e¤ort to draw
some insights.
We increase the value of s from $6 to $15 in increments of $1; for each value
of s, we compute corresponding wholesale and retail prices, and the two supply
chain membersprots for both the game with and the game without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort. We plot Figure 4 to describe our results that are provided in
Table 3 (see Appendix D). As Figure 4(a) indicates, the wholesale price for the
game with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort is decreasing in the value of s whereas
that without the e¤ort is increasing in the value of s. That is, whether or not the
retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper signicantly a¤ects the impact of s on the
manufacturers wholesale pricing decision, which may be justied as follows: if
the retailer is involved into the quality assurance as a gatekeeper, then the retailer
would not sell the identied defects to consumers but directly return them to the
manufacturer. The manufacturer may benet from the earlyreturn of defects,
thereby reducing his wholesale price and encouraging the retailer to serve as the
gatekeeper. Moreover, as the unit disposing cost s is increased, the manufacturers
unit prot is reduced. To assure the total prot, the manufacturer may intend to
reduce his wholesale price, prevent the retailer from choosing a high retail price,
and thus achieve a high demand.
Moreover, we learn from Figure 4(a) that, if s is su¢ ciently small (e.g., s <
11), then the retail price with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort (i.e., pS) is lower
than that without the e¤ort (i.e., pS); but, otherwise, pS > pS. Recall from
Theorem 5 that, if the supply chain-wide cost is reduced as a result of the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort (i.e., S1 + 
S
2 > 0), then p
S < pS. It thus follows that the
supply chain benets from the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort when the value of s is
su¢ ciently small. If the value of s is large, then the retailers quality assurance
cannot generate any benet to the supply chain. We can also observe from Figure
4(b) that the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort with a su¢ ciently high value of s (e.g.,
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Figure 4: The impacts of the manufacturers unit defect disposing cost s on the
wholesale and retail prices and the resulting prots.
s > 11) deteriorates the supply chain, because both the manufacturers and the
retailers prots when the retailer serves as the gatekeeper are lower than those
when the retailer does not serve as the gatekeeper. Therefore, the supply chain-
wide prot is improved by the retailers quality gatekeeping when the value of s
is su¢ ciently small, as shown in Figure 4(c).
Furthermore, we nd that, when the value of s rises, both pS and pS rise; but,
pS is increased with a larger slope. This means that the impact of s on the retail
price is higher when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper. We also note
from Figure 4(a) that, when the retailer serves as the gatekeeper, the retailers
sale prot margin (i.e., pS   wS) is increased as the value of s rises. However,
this does not imply that the retailers total prot (i.e., M) is higher when the
value of s is increased, as shown in Figure 4(b).
4.2.3 Parameters in the Price-Dependent Demand Function
We investigate the e¤ects of the parameters a and b in the aggregate price-
dependent demand function D(p) = a bp. The analysis is necessary because the
two parameters represent the sensitivity of the demand to the retail price. More
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specically, the parameter a is the constant demand that is independent of the
price p. If the value of a is increased but the value of b is unchanged, then the
demand is less sensitive to the price p. Similarly, if the value of a does not vary,
the price p a¤ects the demand more signicantly when the value of b is higher.
Next, we rst consider the impacts of the constant parameter a.
Impacts of the Constant Parameter a We consider the impacts of a on the
pricing decisions and prots as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 10 When the constant (price-independent) demand a is increased,
we nd that the manufacturers defective rate (with or without the retailers
quality gatekeeping e¤ort) and the retailers identication rate (with the retailers
quality gatekeeping e¤ort) are independent of the value of a. Moreover, no matter
whether or not the retailer is involved into the quality assurance, the wholesale
and retail prices, and the two supply chain membersprots are all increasing in
a. Furthermore, the increase in the wholesale price is greater than that in the
retail price, and the increase in the manufacturers prot is also greater than that
in the retailers prot. 
From the above theorem we learn that the manufacturers and the retailers
quality assurance-related decisions (i.e., rS, S; rS) are independent of the con-
stant demand component a. Note from our previous discussion that the parameter
a reects the sensitivity of demand to the retail price. As the value of a rises, the
demand is less sensitive to the retail price if the value of b is unchanged. There-
fore, the supply chain memberse¤orts on their quality control are not associated
with the sensitivity of demand to the retail price. Moreover, we nd from Theo-
rem 10 that, as the demand is less sensitive to the retail price, the manufacturer
and the retailer shall raise their prices and also benet by enjoying higher prots.
This may be justied as follows: since the sensitivity of the demand is reduced,
any increase in the retail price has a smaller impact on the demand. Therefore,
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the manufacturer and the retailer may be likely to increase their prices without
losing their prots. This means that the supply chain benets from the decrease
in the demand sensitivity.
Impacts of the Variable Parameter b Our result for the sensitivity analysis
of the parameter b is presented as in the following theorem.
Theorem 11 When the demand is more sensitive to the retail price that is, the
value of b is increased, the quality assurance-related decisions (i.e., rS, S; rS) are
not changed. Moreover, with and without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort,
the wholesale and retail prices are both decreasing in b; and, the manufacturers
prot is always decreasing in b. But, the resulting demand and prot of the
retailer may or may not be decreasing in b. More specically, for the game with
(without) the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, we nd that, if 3a < 4bpS (3a < 4bpS),
then the demand and the retailers prot is decreasing in b. Otherwise, they may
not decrease as the value of b rises. 
From the above theorem we nd that the demand sensitivity does not impact
the manufacturers and the retailers quality assurance-related decisions but af-
fects their pricing decisions and prots. As the value of b increases, the demand is
more sensitivity to the retail price. the wholesale and retail prices should be both
reduced to entice consumers to buy from the retailer, which, but, reduces the man-
ufacturers and the retailers sale prot margins. Therefore, the manufacturers
total prot is decreasing in the value of b. However, the demand and the retailers
prot may not be decreased as a result of increasing the value of b, depending
on the degree of demand sensitivity to the price. Specically, if the value of b is
su¢ ciently high and the value of a is su¢ ciently low, then the demand is highly
sensitive to the retail price, the condition that 3a < 4bpS (3a < 4bpS) may be
satised, and the demand and the retailers prot are both reduced. Otherwise,
the demand and the retailers prot are both increased. Such a result has been
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demonstrated by a large number of our numerical examples. The above indicates
that the demand sensitivity may deteriorate the supply chain performance. Thus,
the supply chain can benet more from the retailers quality assurance when the
demand is less sensitive to the retail price, probably because the supply chain
members can increase their prices and thus prot margins without reducing the
demand.
4.2.4 Quality-Assurance Cost Parameters
Suppose that the manufacturers and the retailers quality-assurance unit cost
functions are given as C(r) = z1  exp( z2  r) and C^() = z3  exp(z4  ),
respectively, which are used in Examples 1 and 2 to illustrate our analysis in
Sections 3 and 4.1. We now discuss the impacts of the parameters z1 and z2
in the manufacturers quality-assurance unit cost function C(r) and those of the
parameters z3 and z4 in the retailers quality-assurance unit cost function C^().
Such an analysis is important because, as indicated by Theorems 1, 2, and 4, the
parameter values in the functions C(r) and C^() have signicant impacts on the
manufacturers and the retailers decisions. Next, we rst conduct the sensitivity
analysis of z1 and z2 in the function C(r) and then perform our analysis for the
parameters z3 and z4 in the function C^().
Impacts of the Parameters in the Manufacturers Quality-Assurance
Unit Cost Function C(r) We start with the analysis of the impacts of z1
and z2 on the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions. Note that,
when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, the defective rate rS and the
identication rate S in Stackelberg equilibrium are determined by the equations
in (6). Since it would be intractable to analytically nd the impacts of z1 and z2
on rS and S, we perform a numerical study by varying the value of z1 from 9
to 13.5 in increments of 0.5 and increasing the value of z2 from 13 to 22 in steps
of 1. For the sensitivity analysis of z1, we use the numerical results given in
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Table 4; see Appendix D to plot Figure 5 that indicates impacts of z1 on the
manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions and their prots.
Figure 5: The impacts of the parameter z1 in the manufacturers quality-assurance
unit cost function C(r) = z1  exp( z2  r).
We note from Figure 5(a) that, as the value of z1 is increased, the manufac-
turers cost for quality assurance is higher and the manufacture naturally reduces
his e¤ort on the promised defective rate. Therefore, as Figure 5(a) indicates, any
increase in the value of z1 leads the manufacturer to raise his defective rates rS
(for the game with the retailers gatekeeping) and rS (for the game without the
retailers gatekeeping). Since the retailer faces a higher defective rate as a conse-
quence of an increase in z1, she should exert more e¤ort on the quality assurance if
she acts as the gatekeeper. Otherwise, the retailer have to incur a higher penalty
cost for the defects returned by consumers. It thus follows that S is increasing
in z1, as shown by Figure 5(a).
Figure 5(b) presents the impacts of z1 on the wholesale and the retail prices
in Stackelberg equilibrium. More specically, if the value of z1 is increased, then
the manufacturer should raise his wholesale price no matter whether or not the
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retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper. Furthermore, the increase in the whole-
sale price wS for the game with the retailers gatekeeping is higher than that
in the wholesale price wS for the game without the retailers gatekeeping. We
also nd that, when z1 is su¢ ciently high (e.g., z1 > 10), pS < pS. This implies
that, for a su¢ ciently-high value of z1, the supply chain-wide cost is reduced as
a result of the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, as indicated by Theorem 5.
In addition, as we increase the value of z1, the di¤erence between pS and pS is
increased. However, even though the supply chain benets form the retailers
quality gatekeeping by enjoying the cost reduction, we still nd that both the
manufacturers and the retailers prots are decreasing in z1 as shown in Figure
5(c). As a result, the supply chain-wide prot is decreasing in z1 and the prot
without the retailers gatekeeping is higher than that with the retailers quality
assurance e¤ort unless the value of s is su¢ ciently high, as shown in Figure 5(d).
This means that any increase in the value of z1 deteriorates the supply chain
performance. But, the manufacturer and the retailer should be both willing to
operate with the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, because they can achieve
the cost reductions. Moreover, when the manufacturers quality assurance-related
cost is su¢ ciently high, the supply-chain-wide prot is improved by the retailers
quality gatekeeping activity.
Next, we consider the impacts of z2 in the cost function C(r) by conducting
a numerical study where the value of z2 is increased from 13 to 22 in steps of
1. Our results for the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 4 in Appendix
D and are also depicted as in Figure 6. From Figure 6(a) we nd that, when
the value of z2 increases, the manufacturers defective rate rS rises when z2 is
smaller than a cuto¤ level (e.g., z2 < 15) but decreases when z2 is larger than the
cuto¤ level (e.g., z2 > 15). This result happens because of the following possible
reason: if the value of z2 is small, then the manufacturers quality-assurance unit
cost C(r) = z1  exp( z2  r) is high. Even though an increase in the value
of z2 results in an reduction in C(r), the manufacturer still absorbs a high cost
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for assuring the quality. To reduce such a cost, the manufacturer may decide to
spend less e¤ort on the quality control. As a result, the defective rate is increasing
in z2 when the value of z2 is su¢ ciently small. On the other hand, if the value
of z2 is su¢ ciently high, then increasing its value signicantly decreases the cost
C(r), thereby encouraging the manufacturer to promise a lower defective rate.
Because @S=@rS > 0 as discussed previously, the retailers identication rate S
varies in the same manner as rS. But, when the retailer does not serve as the
quality gatekeeper, we nd that the defective rate rS is increasing in the value
of z2, which may reect the fact that, without the retailers involvement into
the quality assurance, the manufacturer does not reduce the defective rate but
increase the rate in order to achieve a high prot. Noting that, rS < rS, as shown
in Theorem 5, we nd that increasing such a low rate does not result in a large
number of defects.
Figure 6: The impacts of the parameter z2 in the manufacturers quality-assurance
unit cost function C(r) = z1  exp( z2  r).
We learn from Figure 6(b) that, no matter whether or not the retailer takes
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the quality gatekeeper role, the manufacturers wholesale price and the retailers
retail price are always decreasing in the value of z2. This results from the fact
that, as a result of an increase in the value of z2, the manufacturer incurs a
lower cost for quality assurance and he could decrease his wholesale price without
reducing his prot margin. The retailer may also decide to reduce her price,
which may lead to a higher demand and thus a higher prot for each supply
chain member, as shown in Figure 6(c). Moreover, we nd from Figure 6(b) and
(c) that, when the value of z2 is su¢ ciently high (e.g., z2 > 15), the retail price pS
(both the manufacturers and the retailers prots) for the game with the retailers
gatekeeping is smaller (are higher) than the retail price pS (the two supply chain
members prots) for the game without the retailers gatekeeping, as indicated by
Theorem 5. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 6(d), the supply chain-wide prot
resulting from the retailers quality assurance e¤ort is higher than that without
the retailers quality gatekeeping, when the value of z2 is su¢ ciently high (e.g.,
z2 > 15). That is, the retailer should be involved in the quality assurance when
the manufacturers quality assurance-related cost is su¢ ciently small.
Impacts of the Parameters in the Retailers Quality-Assurance Unit
Cost Function C^() We now consider the sensitivity analysis of the parame-
ters z3 and z4 in the function C^() = z3 exp(z4). Similar to our above discussion
on the cost function C(r), we cannot analytically investigate the impacts of z3
and z4 on the Stackelberg equilibrium decisions and the manufacturers and the
retailers prots. Note that the retailer does not need to decide on the identi-
cation rate  and incur the quality assurance cost C^(), if she does not serve as
the quality gatekeeper. It thus follows that, for the game without the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort, the manufacturers and the retailers decisions in Stackelberg
equilibrium and their prots are independent of the parameters in the function
C^(). Therefore, we next only perform a numerical study to investigate the
impacts of z3 and z4 on the supply chain with the retailer as the quality gate-
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keeper. Using our results, we plot Figure 7 and 8 that corresponds to Table 5
in Appendix D to describe the impacts.
Figure 7: The impacts of the parameters z3 in the retailers quality-assurance
unit cost function C^() = z3  exp(z4  ).
Figure 7(a) indicates that the manufacturers defective rate and the retailers
identication rate are both decreasing in the value of z3, which is justied as
follows: as the value of z3 increases, the retailer incurs a higher cost for the
quality assurance. For the sake of the protability, the retailer may have to
reduce her e¤ort on the quality gatekeeping, thus decreasing the identication
rate. Since @rS=@S > 0, the manufacturer should respond by reducing the
defective rate. This may reect the following fact: the manufacturer and the
retailer jointly assure the quality. When the retailer does not participate in the
quality assurance or only spends a small e¤ort on such an issue, the manufacturer
may spend more e¤orts to promise a small defective rate.
Because the retailers quality assurance cost rises as a result of an increase
in the value of z3, the retailer would increase her retail price to o¤set her cost
increase. But, since the retailer decides to exert less e¤ort for the quality gate-
keeping, she does not incur a signicantly increasing cost. Therefore, the retailer
60
slightly raise her retail price as a response to the increase in z3, as indicated by
Figure 7(b). Di¤erent from the retail price, the manufacturers wholesale price is
decreasing in z3, possibly because the manufacturer intends to prevent the retailer
with a high quality assurance cost from giving up the gatekeeper role. Further-
more, we learn from Figure 7(b) that both the manufacturers and the retailers
prots are slightly decreasing in the value of z3, as shown in Table 5. That is, any
increase in z3 deteriorates the manufacturer and the retailers benets. However,
we nd from Figure 7(c) that, when the value of z3 is su¢ ciently small (e.g.,
z3 < 0:35), the supply chain-wide prot with the retailers quality gatekeeping
e¤ort is higher than that without the retailers quality assurance. This means
that the whole supply chain benets from the retailers quality gatekeeping if
the retailers quality assurance-related cost is su¢ ciently small. Otherwise, the
retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort will make the supply chain worse o¤.
Figure 8: The impacts of the parameters z4 in the retailers quality-assurance
unit cost function C^() = z3  exp(z4  ).
Figure 8(a) indicates the impacts of z4 on rS and 
S and Figure 8(b) presents
the impacts of z4 on the Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized pricing decisions
and the resulting prots of the supply chain members. Comparing Figure 8(a)
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with 7(a), Figure 8(c) with 7(c), and also Figure 8(b) and 7(b), we nd that the
impacts of z4 are very similar to those of z3, which results from the fact that
C^() = z3 exp(z4 ) = z3 exp(z4) exp(). Thus, our discussion regarding
the sensitivity analysis of z4 follows similar lines as that of z3.
5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider a quality-assurance problem in a two-echelon supply
chain, where a manufacturer promises a defective rate to a retailer who identies
the defects as a quality gatekeeper. Specically, the manufacturer determines
his wholesale price and defective rate i.e., the percentage of the defects in all
products and announces the two decisions to the retailer. The retailer then
responds by deciding on her retail price and the identication rate i.e., the ratio
of the defects identied by the retailer to all defects sold by the manufacturer
to the retailer. Assuming a deterministic, price-dependent demand faced by the
retailer, we characterize the pricing and quality-assurance decision problem as a
leader-follower (sequential) game where the manufacturer and the retailer act as
the leaderand follower,respectively.
We solve the leader-follower game and obtain Stackelberg equilibrium. We
nd that the retailers optimal identication rate should be determined such that
the retailers marginal quality-assurance cost is equal to her expected penalty
cost for each defect sold to consumers. Moreover, the price sensitivity of the
demand signicantly a¤ects the retailers pricing decision; and, the retailer would
prot more when the demand is not sensitivity to the retail price. Our analytic
results also reveal that the manufacturers optimal defective rate is independent
of his per defect penalty cost but dependent on the retailers per defect penalty
cost and his own cost of disposing each returned defect. That is, the value of
the manufacturers penalty cost for each defect does not a¤ect his decision on the
defective rate, when the retailer takes the gatekeeping role. We also learn from our
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analysis that, if the manufacturers marginal cost for quality assurance is higher
than the retailers, then he spends an e¤ort to assure fewer defects owing to the
retailer. We show that, in the game with the retailer as the quality gatekeeper,
the manufacturer can achieve his prot twice as much as the retailers prot.
Next, we analyze the impacts of the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort on
the manufacturers and the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium-based decisions and
their prots. For such an analysis, we rst formulate a leader-follower game in
which the manufacturer, as the leader, still announces his wholesale pricing and
defective rate decisions to the retailer and the retailer does not serve as the qual-
ity gatekeeper and only determines her retail price. Solving the game, we obtain
the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium and compare it with that for the game
with the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. We nd that the manufacturers
Stackelberg equilibrium-based defective rate when the retailer serves as the qual-
ity gatekeeper is higher than the rate rS when the retailer does not take the
gatekeeper role. This means that, as a result of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort,
the manufacturer spends less e¤ort on the quality assurance, thus increasing the
defective rate.
Moreover, we nd that, if the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort can generate a
larger reduction in her own cost per product compared with manufacturers cost
per product, then the wholesale price for the game with the retailers gatekeeping
is higher than that for the game without the retailers gatekeeping. We also show
that, if the entire supply chain can benet by achieving a cost reduction from the
retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, then the retailers equilibrium price when the retailer
serves as the gatekeeper is smaller than that when the retailer does not serve as
the gatekeeper, and the retailers market power in terms of Lerner index is thus
stronger. Our analytic results indicate that, without the retailers gatekeeping,
the manufacturers prot is less than twice as much as the retailers prot. Recall-
ing that, when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers
prot is double of the retailers prot, we conclude that the retailers gatekeeping
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e¤ort increase the ratio of the manufacturerprot to the retailers prot. But,
the result does not mean that the retailer is worse o¤ from her gatekeeping.
In order to investigate the impacts of the parameters in our game model, we
perform sensitivity analysis of each parameter analytically and numerically, and
draw a number of managerial insights, which are summarized as follows:
1. We analytically show that the retailers per defect penalty cost ^ more sig-
nicantly a¤ects the manufacturers and the retailers equilibrium decisions
and prots than the manufacturers per defect penalty cost . Specically,
the two supply chain membersquality assurance-related decisions (i.e., de-
fective rate and identication rate) are independent of the value of  but
dependent on the value of ^. Moreover, the retail price, the demand, and
the two supply chain membersprots do not depend on  but depend on
^.
We show that the manufacturers wholesale price is increasing in his per
defect penalty cost , no matter whether or not the retailer serves as the
quality gatekeeper. As the retailers per defect penalty cost ^ increases,
the manufacturer reduces his wholesale price when the retailer serves as the
quality gatekeeper; but, he increases his wholesale price when the retailer
does not serve as the gatekeeper.
2. When the retailer is involved into the quality assurance, the retailers iden-
tication rate is increasing in her per defect penalty cost ^ whereas the
manufacturers defective rate is decreasing in ^. When the retailer does not
serve as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers defective rate is also
decreasing in ^.
As the value of ^ increases, the retailer raises her retail price, for both the
game with and the game without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. Further-
more, if ^ is su¢ ciently small, then the retailer should assure the quality
as the gatekeeper, because the supply chain-wide cost is reduced as a result
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of the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort. Our results also demonstrate that both
the manufacturers and the retailers prots are decreasing in ^; that is, a
higher value of ^ deteriorates the supply chain performance and discourages
the retailers participation in the quality assurance.
In this thesis, we assume that the retailers unit penalty cost ^ is larger than
manufacturers unit penalty cost  to assure the incentive of the retailer on
the quality gatekeeping. However, one may note from some practices that
^ may be smaller than . For example, the manufacturer (e.g., Toyota)
may possess a higher reputation than the retailer (e.g., Toyotas dealers).
Therefore, the return of a defect bought by a customer may greatly de-
teriorate the manufacturers reputation but may not signicantly impact
the retailers protability. For such cases, the value of  should be higher
than the value of ^; thus, the retailer may benet from each sold defect by
attaining the penalty di¤erence    ^. This may lead the retailer to lose
an incentive for assuring the quality as a gatekeeper in the supply chain.
According to the above discussion, we nd that both a signicantly high
value of ^ and a signicantly small value of ^ (i.e., ^ < ) discourage the
retailer from participating in the quality assurance. That is, a proper value
of the unit penalty cost ^ is important to enticing the retailer to serve its
supply chain as a quality gatekeeper.
3. When the manufacturers acquisition cost c is increased, we analytically nd
that, no matter whether or not the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper,
the manufacturer and the retailer should increase their wholesale and retail
prices, respectively. Moreover, an increase in the acquisition cost c results
in a reduction of the demand for both the game with and the game without
the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort.
We analytically show that the manufacturers and the retailers prots are
both decreasing in the value of c, no matter whether or not the retailer
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is involved into the quality gatekeeping. In addition, the reduction in the
manufacturers prot is greater than the reduction in the retailers prot.
4. Our analytic results indicate that, as the manufacturer incurs a higher cost
in disposing each unit of defect (i.e. the value of unit disposing cost s
increases), the manufacturers defective rate is always decreased for both
the game with and the game without the retailers gatekeeping. Moreover,
when the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper, her identication rate is
also decreasing in s.
For the game without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, we nd that,
as the value of s rises, both the manufactures wholesale price and the
retailers retail price are increased, and their prots are both decreasing.
But, for the game with the retailers gatekeeping, the wholesale price is
decreasing in s whereas the retail price is increasing in s. Moreover, if s is
su¢ ciently small, then the retail price with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort
is lower than that without the e¤ort, which reects that a small value of s
results in a reduction in the supply chain-wide cost and thus induces the
retailer to reduce her price. But, as a result of increasing the value of s,
both the manufacturers and the retailers prots are reduced.
5. We investigate the impacts of the constant term a and the variable term b
in our linear, deterministic price-dependent demand functionD(p) = a bp.
We show that the manufacturers defective rate and the retailers identi-
cation rate are independent of both a and b, for both the game with and
the game without the retailers gatekeeping. Moreover, no matter whether
or not the retailer is involved into the quality assurance, the wholesale and
retail prices, and the two supply chain membersprots are all increasing in
a. Furthermore, the increase in the wholesale price is greater than that in
the retail price, and the increase in the manufacturers prot is also greater
than that in the retailers prot.
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However, When the demand is more sensitive to the retail price that is, the
value of b is increased, the wholesale and retail prices are both decreasing in
b, and the manufacturers prot is always decreasing in b, with and without
the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. But, the demand and the retailers
prot may or may not be decreasing in b, which depends on a specic
condition.
6. We conduct a numerical study to examine the impacts of the parameters
z1 and z2 in the manufacturers quality-assurance cost function C(r) =
z1  exp( z2  r). Our results demonstrate that any increase in the value
of z1 results in a higher defective rate and identication rate. Both the
wholesale price and the retail price are increasing in the value of z1; and,
for a su¢ ciently-high value of z1, the supply chain-wide cost is reduced as
a result of the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort.
When the value of z2 increases with the retailers gatekeeping, the manufac-
turers defective rate and the retailers identication rise when z2 is smaller
than a cuto¤ level but decrease when z2 is larger than the cuto¤ level. But,
when the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper, we nd that the
defective rate is increasing in z2. No matter whether or not the retailer
takes the quality gatekeeper role, the wholesale price and the retail price
are both decreasing in z2, and the manufacturers and the retailers prots
are both increasing in z2.
7. We also conduct a numerical study to discuss the impacts of the parameters
z3 and z4 in the retailers quality-assurance cost function C^() = z3 
exp(z4). We nd that the manufacturers defective rate and the retailers
identication rate are both decreasing in the value of z3 and also in the
value of z4. Moreover, the retail price (the manufacturers wholesale price)
is increasing (decreasing) in both z3 and z4. Both the manufacturers and
the retailers prots are slightly decreasing in the values of z3 and z4; that
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is, any increase in z3 or z4 deteriorates the supply chain performance.
In conclusion, we nd that the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort signicantly
a¤ects the manufacturers and the retailers decisions and prots. As the retailer
serves a quality gatekeeper, the manufacturer would reduce his e¤ort on the qual-
ity assurance but both the manufacturer and the retailer could achieve their cost
reductions, which depends on their quality-assurance costs, their penalty costs
per defect, and the manufacturers cost of disposing each unit of returned defect.
This paper discloses the importance of the retailers gatekeeper role in supply
chain operations. In future, we may extend this paper to, e.g., address the fol-
lowing research problem: two supply chains including one with the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort and one without the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort may com-
pete for consumers in a market. For such a case, we should obtain Stackelberg
equilibrium-based decisions for each supply chain under the competition between
two supply chains.
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Appendices
Appendix A Notations
We provide a summary of major mathematical notations for our game analysis
in Table 2.
Notations
Supply Chain The Game With The Game Without
Member Denition Retailers Gatekeeping Retailers Gatekeeping
Manufacturer Defective rate r r
Wholesale price w w
Unit quality-assurance cost
C(r) = z1 exp( z2r),
where z1; z2 > 0
C(r) = z1 exp( z2r),
where z1; z2 > 0
Prot M M
Cost reduction 1
Penalty cost per defect 
Unit acquisition cost c
Disposing cost per defect s
Retailer Identication rate  
Unit quality-assurance cost C^() = z3 exp(z4),
where z3; z4 > 0

Retail price p p
Prot R R
Cost reduction 2
Penalty cost per defect ^
The linear, deterministic, retail D(p) = a  bp, where a; b > 0 are the constant
price-dependent demand function term and the sensitivity of demand, respectively
Table 2: A summary of major mathematical notations in our game analysis.
69
Appendix B Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. We nd from (1) that the retailers prot R is de-
pendent on two decision variables p and . Taking the rst- and second-order
derivatives of R w.r.t. p, we have,
@R
@p
= a  bf2p  w   C^() + r[  ^(1  )]g and @
2R
@p2
=  2b < 0. (16)
Moreover, we di¤erentiate R once and twice w.r.t. , and nd that
@R
@
= (a  bp)[^r   C^ 0()] and @
2R
@2
=  (a  bp)C^ 00() < 0. (17)
Next, we compute the second-order cross-partial derivative of R as
@2R
@p@
=  b[^r   C^ 0()].
It thus follows that, in the Hessian matrix for the maximization problem, the
rst leading principal minors (i.e., @2R=@p2 and @2R=@
2) are negative; and
the second leading principal minor is calculated as,
@2R
@p2
 @
2R
@2
 

@2R
@p@
2
= 2b(a  bp)C^ 00()  b2[^r   C^ 0()]2, (18)
which cannot be immediately determined to be positive or negative. But, we
nd from the above that, at the point satisfying the rst-order condition that
@R=@ = 0, C^ 0() = ^r and the second leading principal minor in (18) is
reduced to 2b(a  bp)C^ 00() > 0.
As a result, the Hessian matrix for the maximization problem is negative
denite for all possible values of (p; ). This means that the retailers prot
R in (1) is quasi-concave on (p; ). Thus, equating both @R=@p in (16) and
@R=@ in (17) to zero and solve the resulting equations for p and , we prove
the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We learn from Theorem 1 that p = fa=b+w+ C^() 
r[   ^(1  )]g=2. Using this we re-write the manufacturers prot M in (3)
as,
M = [(w c) (+s)r C(r)]
(
a
2
+
br
2
[  ^(1  )]  bw
2
  bC^(
)
2
)
, (19)
where  satises the equation that C^ 0() = ^r, as given in Theorem 1. That
is,  is dependent on the manufacturers decision variable r but is independent
of the manufacturers wholesale price w, i.e., @=@w = 0. Di¤erentiating both
sides of the equation that C^ 0() = ^r w.r.t. r, we have, C^ 00() (@=@r) = ^,
or, @=@r = ^=C^ 00().
Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of M w.r.t. w gives,
@M
@w
=
(
a
2
+
br
2
[  ^(1  )]  bw
2
  bC^(
)
2
)
  b
2
[(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)], (20)
and @2M=@w2 =  b < 0. This means that, for any given value of r, M is
strictly concave in w and the optimal r dependent wholesale price w(r) uniquely
satises the equation that @M=@w = 0 where @M=@w is given as in (20); that
is,
w(r) =

+
s
2

r +
a
2b
+
c+ C(r)  C^()  r^(1  )
2
. (21)
Substituting w(r) into M in (19) and simplifying it, we have,
M =
b
2
[(w(r)  c)  (+ s)r   C(r)]2.
We then di¤erentiate the above once w.r.t. r, and nd that
@M
@r
= b[(w(r)  c)  (+ s)r   C(r)]

@w(r)
@r
  (+ s)  C 0(r)

. (22)
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Using (21) we calculate @w(r)=@r as,
@w(r)
@r
= +
s+ C 0(r)  ^(1  )
2
;
and as a result, @M=@r in (22) can be re-written as,
@M
@r
=   b
2
[(w(r)  c)  (+ s)r   C(r)][s+ C 0(r) + ^(1  )]. (23)
Di¤erentiating the above once w.r.t. r yields,C^ 0() = ^r
@2M
@r2
=
b
4
[s+ C 0(r) + ^(1  )]2
  b
2
[(w(r)  c)  (+ s)r   C(r)][C 00(r)  ^2=C^ 00()], (24)
which cannot be immediately determined as a positive or negative value.
To prove the uniqueness of the optimal solutions, we next analyze the sign
of @2M=@r2 at the points satisfying the rst-order condition that @M=@r = 0.
Equating @M=@r in (23) to zero, we have,
s+ ^(1  ) =  C 0(r), (25)
because, in (23), the term [(w(r)   c)   ( + s)r   C(r)] represents the man-
ufacturers unit prot that is positive. Using (25), we reduce @2M=@r2 in (24)
as,
@2M
@r2

@M=@r=0
=   b
2
[(w(r)  c)  (+ s)r   C(r)][C 00(r)  ^2=C^ 00()],
which is negative if and only if C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 when the defective rate satises
(25).
From our above analysis, we learn that the manufacturers prot M in (3) is
a unimodal function with unique wholesale price and defective rate if and only if
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C 00(r)C^ 00() > ^2 at the point satisfying (25). Thus, we prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. We nd from (8) that the retailers prot R is dependent
on only one decision variable p. Taking the rst- and second-order derivatives of
R w.r.t. p yields,
@R
@p
= a  2bp+ bw   br(  ^) and @
2R
@p2
=  2b < 0, (26)
which means that the prot function R is strictly concave in p and the optimal
retail price p uniquely exists. Equating @R=@p in (26) to zero and solving it for
p, we have the optimal solution p as in (9).
Proof of Theorem 4. Noting from (9) that p = [a=b + w   r(   ^)]=2, we
re-write the manufacturers prot M which is the same as M in (3) as,
M = [(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)]

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

. (27)
The rst- and second-order derivatives of M w.r.t. w are computed as,
@M
@w
=

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

  b
2
[(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)], (28)
and @2M=@w2 =  b < 0. We next di¤erentiate M once and twice w.r.t. r,
which are given as,
@M
@r
=  [+ s+ C 0(r)]

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

+
b
2
(  ^)[(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)], (29)
@2M
@r2
=  C 00(r)

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

 b(  ^)[+ s+ C 0(r)]. (30)
Note that we cannot immediately determine the sign of @2M=@r2 in (30). In
order to show that the optimal solutions are unique, we analyze @2M=@r2 at the
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points (w; r) satisfying the rst-order conditions that @M=@w = 0. Equating
@M=@w in (29) to zero yields,
a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2
=
b
2
[(w   c)  (+ s)r   C(r)]; (31)
and then, setting @M=@r in (29) to zero and simplifying it using (31), we nd
that s + ^ =  C 0(r). It thus follows that the second-order derivative @2M=@r2
in (30) can be re-written as,
@2M
@r2
=  C 00(r)

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

  b[+ s+ C 0(r)]2 < 0.
In order to show the quasi-concavity of the function M on (w; r), we need to
nd whether or not the Hessian matrix is negative semidenite. Our above analy-
sis indicates that the rst leading principal minors (i.e., @M=@w and @M=@r) are
both negative at the points satisfying the rst-order conditions. Next, we calcu-
late the second leading principal minor. The second-order cross-partial derivative
of M as @2M=@w@r = b[2+s  ^+C 0(r)]=2. Furthermore, we nd that, at the
points (w; r) satisfying the rst-order conditions, @2M=@w@r = b(+s+C 0(r)) <
0 and the second leading principle minor is computed as,
@2M
@w2
 @
2M
@r2
 

@2M
@w@r
2
= b C 00(r)

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

+b2[+ s+ C 0(r)]2   b2[+ s+ C 0(r)]2
= b C 00(r)

a
2
+
br
2
(  ^)  bw
2

> 0,
because s + ^ =  C 0(r). Thus, the Hessian matrix is negative denite at the
points (w; r) under the rst-order conditions, which means that the retailers
prot M is strictly quasi-concave on (w; r). Equating both @M=@w in (28) and
@M=@r in (29) to zero and solve the resulting equations for w and r, we prove
the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 5. The comparison between wS and wS follows along
the lines similar to those we presented for the comparison between w and w in
Section 4.1.2. Next, we consider the comparison between pS and pS. Substituting
rS, rS, wS, wS, pS, pS, and S into the optimal (best-response) retail prices
in Theorems 1 and 3, we nd that pS = [a=b + wS   rS(   ^)]=2 and pS =
[a=b+ wS   rS(  ^) + C^(S)  rS^S]=2. As a result,
pS pS = 1
2

(^  )(rS   rS)   , where   wS wS+^rSS C^(S), (32)
where ^  ; and rS  rS, resulting from our argument on Theorem 4 in Section
4.1.2.
Using rS, rS, wS, wS, and S to replace r, r, w, w, and  in (12), we nd
that wS   wS = (S1   S2 )=2, where S1 and S2 are dened as in (15). Then, we
have,
pS   pS =  
S
1 + 
S
2
4
.
It thereby follows that, if S1 + 
S
2 > 0, then p
S < pS and D(pS) > D(pS); if
S1 + 
S
2 = 0, then p
S = pS and D(pS) = D(pS); otherwise, if S1 + 
S
2 < 0, then
pS > pS and D(pS) < D(pS). This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 6. We learn from Section 3.3 that the Stackelberg equilib-
rium wholesale price wS is computed as,
wS =

+
s
2

rS +
a
2b
+
c+ C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
2
, (33)
where rS and S are independent of , as discussed above. Di¤erentiating wS
once w.r.t.  yields that @wS=@ = rS, which means that, as the manufacturers
unit penalty cost  is increased by one dollar, the manufacturer should increase
his wholesale price by rS dollars.
In addition, we nd that the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium retail price pS
75
is,
pS =
1
2
na
b
+ wS + C^(S)  rS[  ^(1  S)]
o
. (34)
The rst-order derivative of pS w.r.t.  is computed as, @pS=@ = (@wS=@  
rS)=2 = 0, which means that, when the retailer does not exert any e¤ort on the
quality assurance, the retail price in Stackelberg equilibrium is independent of
the retailers penalty cost per unit of defect.
The resulting demand D(pS) does not change. According to (3) we have the
manufacturers prot in terms of Stackelberg equilibrium as M = [(wS   c)  
(+ s)rS   C(rS)]D(pS), which can, using (33), be rewritten as,
M =
1
2
ha
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
D(pS), (35)
which is independent of . Using (1) and (33), we compute the retailers prot
in terms of Stackelberg equilibrium as,
R =
1
2
h
2pS   a
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
D(pS), (36)
which is also independent of .
We next analyze the impacts of  when the retailer does not serve as the qual-
ity gatekeeper. From (11), we nd that, for the case, the Stackelberg equilibrium-
based wholesale price is wS = rS + [a=b + c + C(rS) + (s   ^)rS]=2, which is
increased by rS dollars if the value of  rises by one dollar. Using (9) we have,
pS = [a=b+ wS   rS(  ^)]=2 = [3a=b+ c+ C(rS) + (s+ ^)rS]=4,
which does not depend on the value of . Therefore, the aggregate demandD(pS)
is independent of . Similar to our above analysis for the case that the retailer
serves as a gatekeeper, we can show that the manufacturers and the retailers
prots are independent of . This theorem is thus proved.
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Proof of Theorem 7. From the proof of Theorem 6, we nd that, for the
game with the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, the manufacturers wholesale
price in Stackelberg equilibrium is attained as in (33). The rst-order derivative
of wS w.r.t. c is thus computed as @wS=@c = 1=2, which means that, as the value
of c is increased by one dollar and other parameter values are not changed, the
manufacturer should raise his wholesale price by a half of dollar.
Moreover, we learn from the proof of Theorem 6 that the Stackelberg equilibrium-
characterized retail price with the retailers gatekeeping e¤ort is given as in (34);
thus, di¤erentiating pS once w.r.t. c yields, @pS=@c = (@wS=@c)=2 = 1=4. This
means that the retailer should respond to an one-dollar increase in the value of c
by raising her retail price by 25 cents, which is a half of the increase in the man-
ufacturers wholesale price. As a result, the aggregate demand D(pS) = a  bpS
is decreasing in c. Specically, since @D(pS)=@c =  b(@pS=@c) =  b=4, we nd
that, as c is increased by one dollar, the aggregate demand is decreased by b=4
units.
The proof of Theorem 6 also indicates that, when the manufacturer and the
retailer adopt their Stackelberg equilibrium decisions for the game with the re-
tailers gatekeeping e¤ort, the two supply chain membersprots (i.e., M and
R) are attained as in (35) and (36). We take the rst-order derivatives of M
and R w.r.t. c, and have,
@M
@c
=  1
2
D(pS)  b
8
ha
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
< 0,
@R
@c
=  1
4
D(pS)  b
8
h
2pS   a
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
< 0.
The above shows that, as the value of c rises in the game with the retailers gate-
keeping e¤ort, both the manufacturers and the retailers prots are decreased.
Furthermore, the decrease in the retailers prot is smaller than that in the man-
ufacturers prot, because a=b > 2pS   a=b and @M=@c < @R=@c.
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Next, we analyze the impacts of c on the performance of the two-echelon
supply chain without the retailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort. As given in the
proof of Theorem 6, the corresponding Stackelberg equilibrium-based wholesale
and retail prices are attained as wS = rS + [a=b+ c+C(rS) + (s  ^)rS]=2 and
pS = [3a=b+ c+C(rS)+(s+ ^)rS]=4, respectively. Therefore, @ wS=@c = 1=2 and
@pS=@c = 1=4, which are the same as those in the game with the retailers quality
gatekeeping e¤ort. It also follows that the resulting demand D(pS) is decreased
at the rate @D(pS)=@c =  b=4, which is the same as for the game involving the
retailers gatekeeper role.
Using the above, we nd that, when the retailer does not participate in the
quality assurance, the manufacturers and the retailers prots can be written as,
8><>: M = D(p
S) [( wS   c)  (+ s)rS   C(rS)],
R = D(p
S) [(pS   wS) + (  ^) rS].
(37)
Di¤erentiating M and R once w.r.t. c gives,
@M
@c
=  1
2
D(pS)  b
4
[( wS   c)  (+ s)rS   C(rS)] < 0,
@R
@c
=  1
4
D(pS)  b
4
[(pS   wS) + (  ^) rS] < 0,
which means that any increase in the value of c results in a decrease in the
manufactures prot and also a reduction in the retailers prot. According to
(14), we nd that the manufacturers unit prot [i.e., ( wS c) (+s)rS C(rS)]
is higher than the retailers unit prot [i.e., pS  wS+rS( ^)]. Thus, @M=@c <
@R=@c, which is similar to our above analysis for the game with the retailers
quality gatekeeping e¤ort. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 8. From Section 3.3, we nd that, in the game with
the retailer as the quality gatekeeper, the manufacturers defective rate rS and
the retailers identication rate S satisfy the equations that C^ 0(S) = ^rS and
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s + ^(1   S) =  C 0(rS), which imply that S and rS are dependent on s.
Di¤erentiating the two sides of the former equation i.e., C^ 0(S) = ^rS once
w.r.t. rS gives C^ 00(S)(@S=@rS) = ^, or, @S=@rS = ^=C^ 00(S) > 0. Taking the
rst-order derivative of two sides of the equation that s + ^(1   S) =  C 0(rS)
w.r.t. s, we have,
1  ^@
S
@rS
@rS
@s
=  C 00(rS)@r
S
@s
,
which can be re-written as,
@rS
@s
=   C^
00(S)
C^ 00(S)C 00(rS)  ^2 < 0,
because, as discussed in Section 3.3, we reasonably assume that C^ 00(S)C 00(rS) >
^2. Since @S=@rS > 0, we nd that S is also decreasing in s.
When the retailer does not serve as the quality gatekeeper, we learn from The-
orem 4 that the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium-characterized defective
rate rS uniquely satises the equation that s+^ =  C 0(rS). Taking the rst-order
derivatives of both sides of the equation w.r.t. s gives that 1 =  C 00(rS)(@rS=@s),
or, @rS=@s =  1=C 00(rS) < 0, which means that, for the game without the re-
tailers quality gatekeeping e¤ort, rS is decreasing in s. This theorem is thus
proved.
Proof of Theorem 9. According to Section 4.1.3, we nd that, without the
retailers gatekeeping e¤ort, the manufacturers Stackelberg equilibrium wholesale
price is wS = rS+[a=b+c+C(rS)+(s  ^)rS]=2. Di¤erentiating wS once w.r.t.
s yields,
@ wS
@s
= (  ^)@r
S
@s
+
rS
2
,
which is positive because   ^ and @rS=@s < 0 as shown in Theorem 8. In ad-
dition, we learn from Section 4.1.3 that the retail price in Stackelberg equilibrium
is pS = [3a=b + c + C(rS) + (s + ^)rS]=4. Taking the rst-order derivative of pS
w.r.t. s gives that @pS=@s = rS=4 > 0.
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Di¤erentiating the manufacturers prot M and the retailers prot R
which are given as in (37); see the proof of Theorem 7 once w.r.t. s, we have,
@M
@s
=  b@p
S
@s
 [( wS   c)  (+ s)rS   C(rS)] D(pS) r
S
2
< 0,
@R
@s
=  b@p
S
@s
 [(pS   wS) + (  ^) rS] D(pS) r
S
4
< 0.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 10. We rst analyze the impacts when the retailer serves
as the quality gatekeeper. As discussed in Section 3.3, rS and S can be attained
by solving the equations that C^ 0(S) = ^rS and s+ ^(1  S) =  C 0(rS), which
do not involve the parameter a. Thus, rS and S are both independent of a.
We also learn from (33) [given in the proof of Theorem 6] that the Stackelberg
equilibrium wholesale price is wS = (+ s=2)rS + a=(2b) + [c+C(rS)  C^(S) 
rS^(1 S)]=2. Di¤erentiating wS once w.r.t. a yields that @wS=@a = 1=(2b) > 0,
which means that, as the constant parameter a is increased, the manufacturer
should respond by increasing his wholesale price. In addition, we compute the
rst-order derivative of the retailers Stackelberg equilibrium retail price pS
that is given as in (34) w.r.t. a, and nd that @pS=@a = 3=(4b) > @wS=@a > 0.
That is, when the value of a is increased, the retailer should raise her retail
price. Furthermore, the increase in the retail price is larger than the increase
in the manufacturers wholesale price. As a consequence, the demand for the
manufacturers product is increasing in a because @D(pS)=@a = 1=4.
To analyze the impacts of a on the manufacturers and the retailers prots,
we di¤erentiate M in (35) and R in (36) once w.r.t. a, and have,
@M
@a
=
1
2b
D(pS) +
1
8
ha
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
> 0,
@R
@a
=
1
4b
D(pS) +
1
8
h
2pS   a
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
> 0,
which means that the two supply chain members benet from the increase in
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the value of a. Noting that the manufacturers unit prot [i.e., a=b   srS  
c   C(rS)   C^(S)   rS^(1   S)] is greater than the retailers unit prot [i.e.,
2pS   a=b  srS   c C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)], as discussed in Section 3.3,
we nd that @M=@a > @R=@a.
Next, we discuss the impacts of a when the retailer does not participate in the
quality assurance. Similar to the above, we nd that the manufacturers defective
rate rS does not depend on the value of a, because, as Theorem 4 indicates, the
equation that s + ^ =  C 0(rS) does not involve the parameter a. In addition,
we di¤erentiate wS and pS once w.r.t. a, and nd that @pS=@a = 3=(4b) >
@ wS=@a = 1=(2b), which is the same as the case in which the retailer serves as
the gatekeeper. It then follows that @D(pS)=@a = 1=4.
We calculate the rst-order derivatives of M and R [as given in (37)] w.r.t.
a, and nd,
@M
@a
=
1
4
[( wS   c)  (+ s)rS   C(rS)] + D(p
S)
2b
> 0,
@R
@a
=
1
4
[(pS   wS) + (  ^) rS] + D(p
S)
4b
> 0,
which imply that both M and R are increasing in a. Similar to the above, we
also nd that @M=@a > @R=@a. This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 11. Similar to the proof of Theorem 10, we can nd
that Stackelberg equilibrium decisions rS and S (for the game with the retailers
gatekeeping e¤ort) and rS (for the game without the e¤ort) are all independent
of the variable demand parameter b.
When the retailer acts as the quality gatekeeper, we di¤erentiate wS in (33)
once w.r.t. b, and nd that @wS=@b =  a=(2b2) < 0, which means that, as the
parameter b is increased, the manufacturer should reduce his wholesale price. In
addition, we compute the rst-order derivative of pS in (34) w.r.t. b, and have,
@pS=@b =  3a=(4b2) < @wS=@a < 0. That is, when the value of b is increased,
the retailer should decrease her retail price. Furthermore, the reduction in the
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retail price is smaller than the reduction in the manufacturers wholesale price.
However, since @D(pS)=@b =  pS + 3a=(4b) = (3a  4bpS)=(4b), we nd that the
demand for the manufacturers product may or may not be increasing in b, which
depends on the sign of the term 3a  4bpS.
We then calculate the rst-order derivative of M w.r.t. b, and nd that
@M
@b
=   a
8b
ha
b
  srS   c  C(rS)  C^(S)  rS^(1  S)
i
 D(p
S)
2b
[srS + c+ C(rS) + C^(S) + rS^(1  S)]
< 0,
which means that the manufacturers prot M is always decreasing in b. We also
compute the rst-order derivative of R w.r.t. b, and have @R=@b = D(pS)(3a 
4bpS)=(2b2)  [D(pS)]2=b2, which is negative if 3a < 4bpS.
Next, we examine the impacts of b when the retailer does not serve as the
gatekeeper. The rst-order derivatives of wS and pS w.r.t. b are given as fol-
lows: @pS=@b =  3a=(4b2) < @ wS=@a =  a=(2b2) < 0. Similarly, we nd that
@D(pS)=@b = (3a   4bpS)=(4b). We then di¤erentiate M and R once w.r.t. b,
and nd that
@M
@b
=  aD(pS)=(8b2)  3D(pS) [c+ C(rS) + (s+ ^)rS]=(8b)
 pS[( wS   c)  (+ s)rS   C(rS)]=4
< 0,
and @R=@b = D(pS)(3a 4bpS)=2b2 [D(pS)]2=b2, which is negative if 3a < 4bpS,
similar to the case in which the retailer serves as the quality gatekeeper. The
theorem is thus proved.
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Appendix C Proofs of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1. From (4), we nd that the manufacturer should deter-
mine his optimal defective rate r such that s+ ^(1  ) =  C 0(r), which can
be re-written as,
^r =  [s+ C 0(r)] r

1   . (38)
From Theorem 1, we note that, when the manufacturers defective rate is r,
the retailers optimal defective identication rate  satises the equation that
C^ 0() = ^r. Substituting this into (38), we nd that  [s+C 0(r)]r=(1 ) =
C^ 0(), which proves this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2. We nd that, when the retailer serves as the quality
gatekeeper, her unit prot is D(p)=b = a=b   p, where p is given as in (2);
but, when the retailer is not involved into the quality assurance, her unit prot
is D(p)=b = a=b  p, where p is given as in (9). In order to determine in which
setting the retailers unit prot is higher, we need to compare p and p. Using
(2) and (9) we nd that, if C^() < ^r, then C^()   r[   ^(1   )] <
 r(   ^), which means that p < p. It then follows that D(p) > D(p) and
D(p)=b > D(p)=b. The corollary is thus proved.
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Appendix D Numerical Results for the Sensi-
tivity Analysis in Section 4.2
In this appendix, we provide our numerical results for the sensitivity analysis
of some parameters in Section 4.2. Specically, Table 3 indicates the impacts
of the retailers unit defect penalty cost ^ and the manufacturers unit defect
disposing cost s, which are depicted as in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. In Table
4, we present the data indicating the impacts of the parameters z1 and z2 in the
manufacturers unit quality-assurance cost function C(r) = z1 exp( z2r), which
are used to plot Figures 5 and 6. Table 5 involves the data that characterize the
impacts of the parameters z3 and z4 in the retailers unit quality-assurance cost
function C^() = z3 exp(z4), which correspond to Figure 7 and 8.
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